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My dissertation consists of three distinct but related chapters on Energy 
Economics and Finance.  
My first chapter is an empirical evaluation of market conduct in global 
crude oil markets. “Hotelling rule” states that even in competitive equilibrium, 
price of an “exhaustible resource” exceeds its marginal cost due to the 
opportunity cost of depleting the non-renewable resource. This cost is called 
“scarcity rent”. Oil price exceeds its marginal extraction cost significantly. This 
can be attributed to two different sources: effect of scarcity of oil on prices or 
exercising market power by OPEC (collusion). In this paper, I use Porter (1983) 
approach considering the possibility of “scarcity rent” component involved in the 
gap between price and marginal extraction cost in the oil market. The novelty of 
my approach is to empirically estimate scarcity rent using data on cost of 
production of oil. Two benchmark cases, where scarcity rent is either zero (non-
exhaustible resources hypothesis (Adelman 1990)) or equal to minimum price-
cost margin are considered. The results show that in both cases OPEC failed to 
 vii 
cooperate effectively and in second case, market conduct estimated is closer to 
Cournot behavior. 
In the second chapter of my dissertation, we employ a real options 
approach to evaluate oil and gas companies’ investment decisions in an empirical 
setup. We develop a theoretical model to derive testable predictions. A unique 
measure of investment costs is obtained from energy industry data vendors. This 
novel dataset contains details of contract terms and pricing for offshore drilling 
equipment, which constitute the major share of investment costs in offshore oil 
field development. The investment database is combined with financial and 
macroeconomic data, which enables us to perform a panel data analysis of 
investments’ response to variations in investment costs and market variables 
such as the slope of futures curve, firms’ past earnings, cost of capital and 
implied oil price volatility. Our results show that the larger firms, facing less 
financial friction, are more forward looking while the smaller firms, who have 
less access to capital markets, are more dependent on their past earnings. 
The third chapter of my dissertation is about the effect of recent natural 
gas production boom on U.S. manufacturing. Natural gas production in North 
America has increased significantly over the past decade causing the prices to 
plunge during past 5 years. The purpose of this research is to investigate the 
effect of low natural gas prices on energy intensive U.S. manufacturing 
industries using market data. I empirically evaluate the stock market reactions of 
publicly traded companies in energy intensive industries to arrival of new 
information about the unexpected price shocks in natural gas futures markets. 
My results show that the stock market does not react significantly to innovations 
in the expected price of natural gas, proxied for by monthly changes in natural 
 viii 
gas futures contracts with a fixed maturity date. I then split the sample into two 
groups based on their expenditure on natural gas as a ratio of their total 
production value. The stock market valuation of companies in high “natural gas 
intensity” industries were positively affected by unexpected downward shocks in 
natural gas prices and the results are significant.  
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Chapter 1: Are Markups in the Crude Oil Market Caused by 
Exhaustibility or OPEC Market Power? An Empirical Test 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this chapter of my dissertation is to test whether the margin between 
price and the marginal extraction costs observed in the oil market is caused by 
exhaustibility of oil or by OPEC market power. I propose a dynamic model for the oil 
market and empirically test for OPEC market power during 1986-2006 period. My 
estimation approach would be similar to Porter (1983) except that I account for 
exhaustibility of oil and its effect on producers’ optimization problem. The rest of 
introduction will be consisted of OPEC background and brief discussion of related 
literature on identifying collusion in the oil market. In section 2 I will propose the 
theoretical model and how I will deal with difficulties raised by exhaustibility issue. 
Section 3 describes the data used in the estimation procedure. Section 4 describes the 
estimation procedure and results. Section 5 concludes and suggests further extensions.  
According to OPEC official website, “The Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a permanent, intergovernmental Organization, created at 
the Baghdad Conference in September 1960, by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia (major 
crude oil producers in Middle East) and Venezuela. Nine other members joined later in 
1960’s.” According to BP Statistical review 2013, OPEC countries account for 43% of 
oil production and they own 73% of oil reserves today. OPEC is a classic textbook 
example of collusion. Although it seems to have a large market power, many researchers 
have argued that OPEC countries in fact lack a commitment device to coordinate their 
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actions. They conclude that the price volatilities observed in the market are caused by 
other factors such as major supply or demand shocks and exhaustibility effect of crude 
oil rather than collusion and price wars among cartel members. (Cremer, Salehi (1991)). 
James Griffin (1985) tests several alternative hypotheses about the oil market 
and OPEC behavior. In each case he considers a static optimization problem and tries to 
test the hypotheses. These hypotheses include cartel models, competitive market, 
revenue targeting etc. In cartel model he tests whether the observed price can be a result 
of collusive behavior or not. In competitive model he tests MacAvoy’s (1982) 
suggestion that the price of oil is determined mainly according to market fundamentals  
such as supply and demand interaction in a competitive market rather than collusion 
among the oil market players. The revenue targeting case is about the assumption that 
Oil producing countries have target revenue goals. This assumption is justified in an 
imperfect international capital market so the oil producing countries cannot borrow or 
lend in periods of excess or shortage of oil revenue.  
Griffin derives a model for any of the cases described above and tests using the 
quarterly data from 1971 to 1983. The results of empirical tests are that the cartel model 
is not rejected for 7 major OPEC countries while other models are rejected.  
Spilimbergo (2001) uses a similar approach to Griffin but uses a dynamic model 
for the competitive case.  In this case an oil producing country solves an optimization 
problem of extracting an exhaustible resource. As studied in Pindyck (1978). He 
considers a dynamic optimization of an agent in a competitive market of an exhaustible 
resource and tests the hypotheses of a competitive market against a cartel assumption of 
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Griffin. He uses the quarterly data from 1983-1991. He finds that the hypothesis of 
cartel is rejected for all the countries except Saudi Arabia. 
Hotelling (1931) is one of the most influential prices of literature in natural 
resource economics which investigates the exhaustibility of resources. His main result, 
mostly referred to as “Hotelling rule”, states that given a zero marginal extraction cost 
and fixed amount of resource and in absence of substitute goods, there is an implicit 
opportunity cost associated with depleting an exhaustible resource due to its being non-
renewable. The owner of a natural resource should be indifferent between selling the 
resource today or keeping the resource and selling it next period. As a result, the price of 
an exhaustible resource must grow at a rate equal to the rate of interest both along a 
monopolistic extraction path and the competitive resource industry.1 However, price of 
exhaustible resources seem to be random walk rather than growing. This may be caused 
by different several different sources. First of all, changes in extraction costs may affect  
the prices. Secondly, the possibility of discovering a substitute may decrease the 
opportunity cost of depleting the resource and uncertainty about actual size of the stock 
of exhaustible resource may affect scarcity rent because in case another stock of 
resource is discovered, the current oil field may be considered less exhaustible than 
before (see Farzin (1992) and Just, et al (2005)). Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) 
also provide an explanation as to why normal backwardation in oil futures contracts is 
important to encourage extraction of crude oil from reserves.  
                                                 
1
 See Devarajan and Fisher 1981 
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Porter (1983) studies cartel stability in a homogenous goods market (railroad 
transportation) among Joint Executive Committee members.  To identify the collusive 
and non-collusive periods he uses an application of Green and Porter (1984) theoretical 
model. Firms’ profit functions are time separable so each firm solves a static problem in 
each period except considering the possibility of collusion and possible benefit of not 
deviating from collusive behavior. In an exhaustible resource case, each firm’s 
optimization problem inherently bears a dynamic aspect due to exhaustibility of the 
resource. Porter then derives a FOC depending on market conduct: 
p
 1 + θ
α = DQ
																				(1.1) 
In which   is price at period t,  is price elasticity of demand, D is a function 
of specific parameters and  is quantity supplied to the market.	θ takes values 1, ∑s
  or 
0 in collusive, Cournot and perfect competition, respectively.  He uses a switching 
regressions approach proposed by Kiefer (1980) and finds model parameters including 
market conduct using maximum likelihood estimation. He also identifies collusive 
periods from non-collusive ones in an iterative process: taking an initial guess for 
collusion dummy variables, calculating model parameter values, taking these values as 
given calculating collusion probabilities in each period and updating the parameter 
estimates and continuing this process until convergence. Porter (1983) provides a novel 
framework for studying cartel stability however one should be careful about the 
assumptions and the nature of the market. For example, in transportation cost, there are 
some close substitutes available which are not present in the oil market. Also the 
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exhaustibility of oil would cause a positive margin between extraction cost and price 
even in a perfectly competitive market (for a confusion of marginal extraction cost and 
marginal total cost see Almoguera and Herrera (2007)) 
Almoguera and Herrera (2007) apply Porter (1983) approach to the oil market 
using quarterly data from 1974-2004. They use the same functional form assumptions as 
Porter (1983) about the oil market. Their estimation result shows that the oil market was 
more in a Cournot competition rather than collusion especially in last 20 years.  
Although they derive reasonable results, they do not consider the intrinsic differences 
between oil and railroad transportation. First of all, they do not enter the exhaustibility 
of oil into their optimization problem. Second problem with their approach is that their 
demand function specification is exactly like Porter’s specification for railroad 
transportation which does not seem to be necessarily true for the oil market. In contrast, 
the literature on oil demand estimation uses another specification which is described in 
section 1.2. This specification might be problematic because they do not consider that 
there is no good substitute for oil so its demand is pretty persistent in short-run. Many 
researchers include lagged consumption as a measure of infrastructure installed which 
depend on oil consumption like power plants, cars, factories etc in estimation of oil 
demand. The result of their estimation for price elasticity is relatively high rather than 
other estimates in literature. (See Gately and Huntington (2002) and Cooper (2003)) 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to 
discussion of the theoretical model and effect of exhaustibility on the optimization 
decision of oil producers as well as the industrial organization of the oil market. I 
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describe the data I use for empirical strategy in section 3. Estimation results are 
presented in section 4. In section 5 I discuss potential extensions and conclude the paper.  
1.2. MODEL 
1.2.1 Optimization Problem 
Demand function estimations are derived from Gately and Huntington (2002) 
with the following specification: 
log	Q
 = α$ + α log p
 +α g
 +	α% log Q
 +U
																						(1.2) 
where p
 denotes crude oil price in period t, Q
 denotes total quantity of crude oil 
consumed in period t, g
 denotes growth in world real GDP and  U
 is error term which 
is assumed to be iid normal across periods.2 Including lagged value of consumption is 
widely accepted in estimation of demand for oil because this variable incorporates the 
fact that there is not a good substitute for oil, at least in the short run, so the demand is 
expected to be relatively persistent in consequent periods.3 Alternative specifications are 
assessed but the coefficient results are virtually not changed. 
I assume a simple differentiable convex extraction cost function for tractability 
of model. Although this function cannot perfectly describe production behavior in long 
run, it can serve as a good approximation in the short run.  However, due to huge 
                                                 
2
 I have tested equation (1.2) for serial correlation among error terms and the hypothesis for % = 0	was 
rejected (with a t-statistic=49) and the corresponding Durbin-Watson d-statistic is 1.929 which in fact 
shows that assuming no serial correlation is reasonable.  
3
 Furthermore, price elasticity of demand for oil is asymmetric but for simplicity I will assume a simpler 
specification similar to third approach in Gately and Huntington  (2002). 
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variability of extraction costs4  across different regions and oil fields, I assume that cost 
functions are producer specific: 
C(q
) = aq
 + c$																						(1.3) 
where δ > 1 so that extraction of an extra unit of oil becomes more and more 
costly as extraction rate increases.5 
In order to incorporate exhaustibility of oil, I will consider the simplest case for 
the moment6 where each producer exactly know S$, total oil reserves at time 0,  
extraction cost function C(q
),	is only a function of amount produced q
,  at each time 
period t,	hence does not change over time, and producers have perfect foresight about 
prices.7 I will assume a competitive fringe (Non-OPEC producers) and a potentially 
collusive section (OPEC) in the market. Each producer solves the following problem: 
max456 	{8β
:p
q
 − C(q
)<
=

>$
																		profit	maximization	problem		(1.4)	 
subject to exhaustibility of the total oil reserves she owns: 
∑q
 ≤	S$																									exhaustibility	constraint		(1.5)	
                                                 
4
 According to Energy Information Administration, extraction of a barrel of oil using water injection in 
deep oil wells in west Texas would cost $45 in 2006 while in some oil wells in other parts of world it 
cost less than $5. 
5
 Considering technical issues regarding life cycle of oil wells, there is an optimal maximum extraction rate 
from any specific oil well so extracting more than that rate destroys the oil well so in fact costs more to 
producer. Slower extraction rates will not harm the well but may not be economically viable.  
6
 It is important to notice that the uncertainties about the total reserves and new technological innovations 
will challenge these assumptions. Hence, I will relax some of these assumptions later, especially the one 
about fixed stock of exhaustible resource, which will have important implications for scarcity rent 
estimation as discussed in section 1.2.3.   
7The assumption about perfect foresight about future prices is strong and will be relaxed later. Nonetheless, 
the existence of widely traded oil futures contracts reveals information to the producers regarding the 
expected future movements of oil prices given all available information at each point of time.  
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Using Lagrange multiplier	λ for the exhaustibility constraint, one can derive the  
first order necessary condition (FONC) as follows: 
β
(p
 + q
 ∂p
∂q
 − C′(q
)) = λ																											FONC	(1.6) 
Rewriting the FONC using β = TU  we can derive: 
p
 + q
 ∂p
∂q
 − C′(q
) = λ(1 + r)
																								(1.7) 
Equation (1.7) has important implications: First notice that in a competitive 
market, where change in quantity of a single producer would not affect the market price, 
equation (1.7) reduces to a version of Hotelling rule which states that the price-cost 
margin of an exhaustible resource will increase exponentially over time with the interest 
rate: 
p
 − C′(q
) = λ(1 + r)
 		⇒ p
TXY5(456Z[)p
 − C\(q
) = (1 + r)																		Hotelling	Rule	(1.8)	
Second, given our demand specification in Equation (1.2), price elasticity of 
demand is α so we can rewrite Equation (1.7) to derive: 
p
 + q
 ∂p
∂q
 − C′(q
) = λ(1 + r)
 	⇒ 	p
 +
q
 ∂p
∂Q

∂Q
∂q
 		= C′(q
) + λ(1 + r)
 
⇒	p
 + q
p
αQ
 	
∂Q
∂q
 = C′(q
) + λ(1 + r)
 
⇒	p
 + p
	s
α 	
∂Q
∂q
 = C′(q
) + λ(1 + r)
 
⇒ p
 1 + θ
α = C\(q
) + λ(1 + r)
																				Market	structure	equation		(1.9) 
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where θ
 is the elasticity of total output w.r.t firms own output. This will be 
equal to zero, 1 or s
 = 456c56 respectively in perfectly competitive, collusive or Cournot 
competition cases.8 It can be shown that given specification of demand and cost 
functions, market shares are constant over time. Multiplying both sides of equation (8) 
with market shares and summing over all producers, world oil supply equation can be 
derived:  
p
 1 + θ
α = DQ
 + 	λ(1 + r)
													Market	structure	equation	(1.9\) 
where D = δd∑ a
[
[ef g

	and	θ
 = ∑ s
θ
 .  
Porter (1983) derives a similar equation but without a scarcity rent term: 
λ(1 + r)
. He then proceeds by taking logs and hence deriving a log linear supply 
function. Note that I can not apply the same approach because there exists an extra 
additive term that would not come out of logarithm function. Using exact Porter 
approach one cannot estimate all the parameters and they would not be identified.  I will 
try to get around this problem by finding a proxy for scarcity rent in a way that I can 
estimate the above model. 
1.2.2. Scarcity Rent Problem 
If information on marginal extraction cost in a competitive market were 
available, we would be able to take margin between price and marginal extraction cost 
as scarcity rent. Although the oil market is relatively concentrated, it also has a 
                                                 
8
 For a detailed  discussion of different market conducts and calculation steps for the market conduct index 
in the oil markets see: Almoguera and Herrera (2007) 
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competitive fringe. I will estimate scarcity rent in each period by looking at active oil 
wells with highest production costs and take the margin between these costs and oil 
price as scarcity rent. The rationale for this approach is that the most costly wells are just 
indifferent between producing and not producing considering all costs including scarcity 
rent. By taking these observations on highest cost producing wells I am in fact looking at 
last entrant in the market and since these last entrants will be close to break even point,9 
their marginal revenue of extracting one barrel of oil (price) should equal their marginal 
total cost which is consisted of marginal extraction cost plus the scarcity rent:  
 +ijklmnjo	pqkjrmsn	rst = ujklmnjo	sjo	rst ≤ kmrp 
For the last entrant, the inequality above should bind. This margin will serve as a 
measure for scarcity rent. Of course there are lower cost producers in the market but 
their price-cost margin would be the scarcity rent plus some cost advantage in 
production.10 
Looking at the data about this margin, it seems to be almost a constant fraction of 
oil price in each period. The ratio of price-cost margin to oil price,k, for these wells is 
estimated11 to be 0.2377 with R-squared ratio of 0.84 so I will employ this estimation 
and insert it into the Equation(8) to derive the following equation: 
                                                 
9
 I am in fact assuming low entry and exit costs for these last entrants which is reasonable considering the 
nature of small producers that are analyzed here.  
10
 Note that the assumptions behind this argument is that First, the oil produced in different wells is almost 
homogenous which is not a very strong assumption specifically because the minor differences in quality 
of different oil types is offset by minor differences in their prices. Second assumption is that scarcity 
rent for different types of oil is almost the same which given the previous assumption about 
homogeneity, and noting that scarcity rent is in fact the opportunity cost of selling oil today rather than 
keeping it to the next period, is again not a very strong assumption.  
11
 For detailed estimation process refer to section 1.3. 
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p
 1 + θ
α = DQ
 + 	kp
 
p
 1 + θ
α − k = DQ
												Simplified	Market	structure	equation	(1.10) 
1.2.3. Further Notes on Estimating Scarcity Rent 
“Scarcity rent” refers to opportunity cost of selling a unit of exhaustible resource 
today rather than keeping it to the next period and selling it then. As a result, in a perfect 
competition case, price of an exhaustible resource would be equal to its “user cost” 
which equals marginal extraction cost plus scarcity rent. If our simplifying assumptions 
about extraction of an exhaustible resource at the beginning of section 2 were not too 
strong then the Hotelling rule would predict that this scarcity rent would exponentially 
increase. However, there are some issues that challenge Hotelling rule. First, there is a 
lot of uncertainty about the probable amount of oil in earth. As a clarifying example, 
assume that an extraordinarily huge oil field, comparable to total proved reserves, is 
discovered today. As a result of this discovery, the exhaustibility of oil becomes less 
relevant so scarcity rent would decrease.12 On the other hand, expectations of future 
prices play a crucial role on the “opportunity cost” of selling a resource today. This is 
because if for any reason owners of the exhaustible resource believe that next period’s 
price will fall (due to an innovative backstop technology or low economic growth), then 
the opportunity cost of selling the resource today will decline.  All mentioned above 
                                                 
12
 For example, coal is sometimes assumed to be non-exhaustible because at current consumption rates it 
will last for more than 3000 years so in fact there is not much exhaustibility rent associated with coal. 
For more discussion see Khanna (2003) 
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make it difficult to derive a straightforward estimate for scarcity rent.13 However, 
looking at data as described in section 3 we could infer that due to contribution of all 
different sources to scarcity rent, empirically we observe a constant ratio of price to be 
an upper bound for scarcity rent so I will employ that estimate. 
Legal contracts on royalties paid to the owner of a natural resource could also be 
a candidate for estimating of scarcity rent but there are 2 problems: First, Legal contracts 
on oil fields are usually long term which do not reflect changes in scarcity rent in short 
term.14  Second issue could be observed especially when the price of oil declines and as 
a result previously operative oil wells become inactive although according to their 
contracts the royalty rate is a fixed portion of the production revenue which is in fact not 
realized  (because revenue of the oil well is zero in inactive periods.) 
1.2.4. Identifying Collusion 
Given the above functional form assumptions, the estimation process is similar to 
that of Porter (1983). Suppose {It} is a sequence of zero and one in which one indicates 
a collusive regime. Taking logarithm from both sides of Equation (1.10) we can derive 
the supply relationship: 
 
Log	p
 = β$ + β	Log	Q
 + β S
 + β%I
 + U 
													Supply	function	(1.11) 
 
                                                 
13
 For a detailed discussion of dynamics of scarcity rent see Farzin (1992) 
14
 For example as a result of anticipating a recession, price of oil in future may be expected to fall so the 
scarcity rent would decrease. After this concern regarding recession is removed, the scarcity rent would 
increase again so the scarcity rent is almost as volatile as oil price itself. 
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where S
 are shocks to supply in the oil market and U 
 are assumed to be iid 
normal across periods. Furthermore,  
β$ = logD 
     β = δ − 1 
β% = − log 1 + x − 																	(1.12) 
Given these parameter values, we can calculate the value of θ
 as follows: 
θ = α(exp(−β%) − 1 + k
) 
Depending on values of θ we can classify the conduct of market. If θ = 1, OPEC 
members are following an optimal cartel behavior and market has a competitive fringe,15 
if θ=0, The market is in perfect competition and if θ = ∑s
 =0.08 the market conduct is 
closer to a Cournot behavior with a competitive fringe. However, it is important to 
notice that in equilibrium θ = 1 might not be supported by the set of trigger strategies 
and punishments. In fact, at θ = 1 agents could earn maximum profit but on the other 
hand they have more strong incentive to deviate from optimal cartel behavior because 
the gain from deviation would be higher in case all other members of cartel are 
following the optimal cartel behavior. As a result, we would not expect to see θ = 1 
case in equilibrium of this repeated game but a x	 ∈ (0,1)	  which as x gets closer to 1 
the regime is more collusive and as it goes to zero, it will be more competitive.  
Similarly, when the scarcity rent is present in a market, in case of perfect 
competition the price is higher than marginal cost so the difference between the payoff 
                                                 
15
 For a detailed discussion of a dominant firm with a competitive fringe see Church and Ware (1999). 
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from colluding or deviating to a non-cooperative case is less than a market in which 
scarcity rent effect is not present. As a result, we would expect that in a market with a 
high scarcity rent collusion is more sustainable, frequency of punishment periods is low 
and their duration is also short.  
If the collusive and non-collusive periods were known, the estimation of 
parameters of above model would be straightforward using a two step least squared 
method but unfortunately this is not the case. However, using simultaneous switching 
regressions approach proposed by Kiefer (1980) we can use maximum likelihood 
estimation approach to estimate both parameters of the model and also identify the 
collusive and non-collusive periods.16  
1.3. DATA 
In this section I will discuss about data sources and summary statistics. To 
estimate scarcity rent, I obtained the marginal extraction cost of oil wells from EIA 
(2003) and EIA (2007) which have annual extraction cost data from 1986-2006. The 
above mentioned reports have detailed cost data for different categories of oil wells. 
Data for each category is generated by taking average of costs for 10 typical oil wells of 
the category. I picked the highest cost wells which were most costly oil wells in USA 
due to their characteristics (8000ft depth) and also costly extraction technology (water 
injection) used in extracting oil. I also use price of the corresponding oil type (West 
Texas Intermediate) for estimation of scarcity rent.  
                                                 
16
 For a detailed discussion of the estimation process refer to Porter(1983) 
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Variable 
2006 
value 
Mean Min Max 
Standard 
deviation 
Measurement 
unit 
World oil consumption 85138 72441 61163 85138 15949.5 
Thousand 
barrels/day 
West Texas 
Intermediate oil price  
65.14 45.795 26.45 90.10 27.38 2006 $/barrel 
World real GDP growth 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.8 0.29 % growth 
Marginal extraction 
costs 
36.56 23.9 11.23 36.56 17.91 2006 $/barrel 
Table 1.1:  Summary statistics for the variables used in estimations  
 
Since scarcity rent estimated is central to the estimation procedure and it could 
vary according to major regime changes in other periods of time, and also because I did 
not have cost data from years before 1986, I preferred to limit the dataset time span to 
cost data time span. To maintain consistency and validity of my estimations, I use the 
same time span for my estimations although I use quarterly data17 to be able to obtain 
better estimations. Hence, I will use quarterly data on oil production and real prices 
                                                 
17
 Although the data are quarterly, because the demand for oil at every period is worldwide which has all 
different kind of weather I have not included seasonal dummies. Besides that, since the supply chain of 
oil is in most cases vertically integrated, it takes several weeks from the start of extraction until the 
retailers deliver the product to consumers and hence the effect of seasonal changes is not so significant.   
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(2006 Dollars) from 1986 quarter 1 to 2006 quarter 4.18 This data were obtained from 
Energy Information Administration website. To construct supply and demand shocks I 
used information on EIA annual chronology of the oil market to find major supply and 
demand increase or decreases. The data on real GDP growth was obtained from the 
World Bank development indicators. The data is summarized in Table 1.1.  
1.4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
In this section, I will discuss about estimation procedure and estimated results. 
1.4.1. Scarcity Rent 
Figure 1.1 shows marginal extraction cost (black) and crude oil price (grey) for 
10 oil wells in west Texas during 1986 and 2006. According to EIA (2007), these oil 
wells were most costly oil wells in USA due to their characteristics (8000ft depth) and 
also costly extraction technology (water injection) used in extracting oil. The data for 
this estimation was obtained from EIA (2003) and EIA (2007) reports. These reports 
include operating cost information in several types of oil wells across USA. I used data 
operating cost of different types of oil wells with different extraction technologies and 
calculated per unit extraction costs and selected the most costly wells which are deepest 
oil wells (8000 ft) with the water injection extraction technology which results in the 
highest marginal extraction cost. 
                                                 
18
 In comparison, Almoguera and Herrera (2007) use a similar data in frequency but their data span is from 
1974 to 2004 but the rest of common data are similar. I use cost data that they don’t use. 
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Figure 1.1:  Oil price and operating costs for most costly wells in West Texas. (2006 
dollars) Source: EIA (2003) and EIA (2007) 
I run a regression to test for a relationship between price-cost margin and price at 
any given point in time. The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 1.2.  
Price-cost margin 
(scarcity rent) 
Coefficient Standard error 95% confidence interval 
Price 0.238 0.0229 [0.1901, 0.2853] 
   R-squared= 0.8437 
Table 1.2: Estimation of scarcity rent from most costly producing wells, derived from the 
following regression:  =  +  
 
1.4.2. Supply Function Estimation 
Although there is not a consensus about estimation of oil supply function but 
literature on oil demand estimation is well established and agreed upon. I will employ 
0
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estimation of demand function parameters, specifically a modified version of Gately and 
Huntington (2002) and insert these estimates19 into my likelihood function and try to 
estimate supply function parameters and market conduct. 20 I will use quarterly data on 
oil production and prices obtained from Energy Information Administration webpage. 
To construct supply and demand shocks I used information on EIA annual chronology 
of the oil market to find major supply and demand increase or decreases. The data on 
GDP growth was obtained from World Bank development indicators.  
I developed Matlab21 programs for estimating Maximum likelihood estimators.22 
The supply estimates are displayed in Table 1.3. The standard errors are calculated using 
the Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (BHHH) method. Unfortunately they are higher 
than expected and the estimation results are relatively poor. They can probably be 
improved by choosing better instruments for my estimation. Standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis.  
Variable 
Estimated Supply 
function coefficients 
z$ 
−3.23 
(1.31) 
                                                 
19
 The estimates of Gately and Huntington is modified to match the data structure I have here and the 
parameter values are 	$ = 	1.27,  = −0.05,  = −0.02	jn{	% = 0.91 
20
 I have also tried to jointly estimate both supply and demand functions but parameter estimates in that 
case where poor and my attempt was unsuccessful. However in next stages of this research I will try to 
find better instruments for supply and demand and try to jointly estimate supply and demand 
parameters. 
21
 Matlab files are available upon request. 
22
 For detailed discussion of this approach refer to Porter(1983) 
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z 
3.08 
(1.96) 
z  
0.21 
(0.14) 
z% 
-30.21 
(12.73) 
Table 1.3: Supply function estimated coefficients, used to back up production function 
parameters (Standard error in parenthesis) 
 
From above estimates we can derive: 
   β = 3.08 ⇒ 	δ = 4.08																											(1.13)    
β% = −30.21	 ⇒ 	θ = 	0.038																				(1.13′) 
It is worth noticing that δ = 4.08 represents a relatively inelastic supply 
function, which is a reasonable result.  Also resulted estimate for θ = 0.038 is almost 
consistent with Cournot behavior rather than collusion.  
The estimated sequence of I
 converged to zero for all periods of sample which 
indicates that according to my estimates in fact OPEC failed to effectively cooperate on 
increasing prices in this sample period. This can be justified by high incentives to 
deviate from optimal collusive behavior among OPEC members because most OPEC 
countries governments are heavily dependent on oil revenue. This estimate for I
 is in 
fact consistent with Lin (2007) result which does not find evidence on collusion during 
1989-2004 period. My result is to some extent consistent with Almoguera and Herrera 
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(2007) which identify rare collusion periods during same period of time. However, 
Almoguera and Herrera (2007) demand function specification is different from mine 
because in contrast with the literature on demand estimation for oil, they do not include 
lagged consumption in their demand function so their price elasticity is relatively high 
which may result in some bias in estimating collusive periods. However, if I impose 
SR=0, my estimate of θ would become 0.0521. They have derived this number to be 
0.1161 which should be the effect of difference in demand specification we have rather 
than scarcity rent. 
It might seem unreasonable that | is zero in all periods in my estimation. In fact 
it would be better if our estimates showed that for some periods this sequence is 
nonzero. However, this will not result in a problem with identification of z%	sk	x . This 
is because in fact the sequence would not converge to 0 itself but it is derived from 
regime classification probabilities when the stopping criterion is reached. Similar to 
Porter (1983), in my estimation, I calculate the regime classification sequence 
{}, … , }}. As Lee and Porter (1984) show, the total probability of misclassification 
would be minimized if classification series  | is generated according to the rule that  
			| = 1	m		} > 0.50						sℎpk}mtp 																		(1.14) 
So as it is clear from discussion above, even if  | is equal to zero for all periods, 
it does not mean that the probability of being 1 is zero but it means that this probability 
is less than half.  
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It is important to notice that, if we assume that oil is not exhaustible, the 
estimation that we derive for x is higher than when we consider exhaustibility. This 
shows that some of market power estimated for OPEC in the literature might in fact be 
exhaustibility effect rather than pure market power. To summarize, including Scarcity 
rent would decrease our estimate for OPEC market power so at least a fraction of 
markups observed in the market can be attributed to exhaustibility. 
1.5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I tried to test whether OPEC exercises market power in the oil 
market or exhaustibility causes a positive price-cost margin. I considered the 
exhaustibility of oil and formulated an infinite horizon optimization problem that 
producers face. I imposed some functional form assumptions. To get a equation form 
that can be estimated I estimated scarcity rent empirically. Using this estimation I 
derived a loglinear supply function. I estimated supply function parameters and also 
identified collusive and noncollusive periods using Porter (1983) approach.  The 
estimation showed that there is not much evidence on collusion during this period of 
time and including scarcity rent would even decrease the level of market power 
estimated by model. Supply function parameters estimates are also reasonable.   
Next step for this research would be trying to estimate both supply and demand 
functions jointly. In order to do so I will need to find some supply and demand shocks to 
be able to estimate the simultaneous supply and demand equations.  I have made strong 
functional form assumptions that should be relaxed in next versions of this paper. My 
operating cost data was limited to 1986-2006 which resulted in a limitation of time 
 22 
period investigated. A future step, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation, is to 
find other proxies for scarcity rent that could serve for a longer period of time so that I 
can expand the time scope of this estimation to include more variation in prices which 
will increase the probability of including collusive periods in my sample.    
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Chapter 2:  Empirical Evaluation of Oil and Gas Companies’ 
Investment Decisions: A Real Options Approach 
2.1. INTRODUCTION  
Lack of flexibility to adjust production rates among oil and gas producers 
contribute to an inelastic supply in global energy markets where slight perturbations in 
demand translate into significant fluctuations in prices. Creating extra production 
capacity requires exploration and development activities, which involves drilling wells 
into the earth to reach deep layers of hydrocarbon rich rocks. Thus, drilling is the central 
activity to extract oil and gas from untapped underground reservoirs. This explains why 
oil and gas companies spend billions of dollars on drilling each year therefore drilling 
activities’ costs constitute the majority of their capital expenditure in exploration and 
development of new production capacity.  
Drilling equipment, often referred to as “drilling rigs”, are mobile equipment that 
are transferred to the drilling location, perform the assigned task which usually takes a 
few months and then transferred to the next drilling location. The long-term production 
requires installation of a production platform. Specialized service companies own the 
drilling equipment and rent them out to petroleum companies. According to oil industry 
experts, the rental cost of this equipment can be so large that in the case of offshore 
drilling it can reach up to 70% of cost of new well development.23 Hence, these rental 
rates can affect the decision of oil and gas companies either to undertake an investment 
opportunity or to wait for better market conditions.  
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 The author has obtained these information through verbal communication with the industry experts.  
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We have obtained a unique dataset on the rental market for offshore drilling rigs. 
Since drilling rigs are in fixed supply in the short-run, one can infer the value of the 
option to wait by examining the rental rates of drilling rigs. For instance, if firms decide 
to wait and postpone their investments, demand for drilling rigs drops so the rental rates 
will decline, which in turn increases the incentive to drill. This balancing force adjusts 
the rental rates in the drilling rigs market so that in equilibrium the marginal firms 
become indifferent between investing today or waiting for one period. We exploit this 
equilibrium dynamic in our theoretical simple real options model.  
Unique characteristics of exhaustible natural resources require distinct 
approaches in evaluating related investment projects. On the one hand, unlike many 
other investments, the capital expenditure for developing an offshore oil field is almost 
entirely irreversible as the scrap value of the projects is close to zero. On the other hand, 
the developer of an unexploited oil field often has some discretion over the timing of 
exploiting this one time opportunity to invest. The irreversibility and discretion over 
timing of the investments make these types of investment opportunities comparable to 
financial call options.24  
A call option gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to pay a certain 
price and receive the underlying asset. The interested party should pay a fee (premium) 
in advance for this right. A “lease” for an oil or gas field, for instance in the Gulf of 
Mexico, has properties parallel to a call option. To own the right to develop a certain 
                                                 
24
 Considering the possibility of exercising these options at any time, these investment opportunities are 
similar to American-style call options.  
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block in the Gulf of Mexico, petroleum companies participate in an auction. The winner 
of the lease pays a fee and obtains the right to start drilling for a certain period of time, 
typically 5-8 years. If the lease owner does not start drilling in the predetermined time 
window, they will lose their right to drill at the expiration date of the lease. However, if 
they start drilling, they will maintain their right for as long as they operate on that block. 
Once the drilling begins, the owner of the lease has exercised her option; she no longer 
has the discretion to wait for further information to arrive in future.  
One major deviation of an offshore investment opportunity from a financial call 
option is in its “exercise price”. The owner of a call option knows in advance the exact 
price he has to pay to exercise his right whereas a lease owner in an offshore oil field 
will learn about exact costs of development after it obtained the lease. We allow the 
strike price to vary in our model. Factors that affect the value of this “option” will not be 
incorporated in the option value itself (lease bid) but in the exercise price (cost of 
development) 
Offshore oil and gas investments are best analyzed using real options approach. 
We develop a simple real options model in which the prices for capital goods are 
determined in equilibrium. This simple yet powerful model provides intuitive insights 
into the market for investment equipment in the oil and gas industry. According to the 
model, companies facing investment opportunities can decide to invest now or postpone 
their investment decisions.  Their decisions are based on current and past market 
conditions as well as their expectations about future variables given all available 
information at each point of time.  If they decide not to exercise their “option” and stay 
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away from investing, the market for relevant capital goods will be affected as demand 
for these goods declines. In a relatively competitive market for capital goods, a drop in 
demand for this equipment will drive prices of capital goods down. Hence, today’s 
investment costs will adjust so that energy companies’ propensity to invest equates 
across different time periods and the option value of waiting goes away. We exploit this 
prediction of the model to form our hypotheses and derive our empirical strategy. We 
propose a novel way to empirically measure the demand for investment goods and 
control for different contributing factors in order to test our hypothesized predictions. 
Our real options model enables us to derive testable predictions. The uncertainty 
about the future increases the value of the option to wait hence it will discourage 
investments in the present. Additionally, the more firms discount future cash flows, the 
lower the opportunity cost of waiting. The arrival of new information also plays a 
crucial role. If an investor receives an information signal that is indicative of higher 
prices in the future, the expected opportunity costs of waiting will increase. The firm 
will lose out if it has not built the required production capacity to produce when prices 
increase. Hence, any information regarding market anticipation of prices in the next 
periods, affects the value of the investment opportunity.  
Futures contracts incorporate information signals about future prices. These 
contracts have been widely traded on exchanges during the past few decades. As the 
trading volume grows over time, these contracts become liquid and can serve as a 
frictionless reflector of the market’s expectation of actual prices in the future. If we 
assume that futures contracts are efficient aggregators of market players’ perceptions 
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about the evolution of prices in the future, higher futures prices will decrease the value 
of the option to wait.  
All arguments so far were based on the assumption that firms can undertake any 
project they perceive as profitable. This assumption is only true if perfect capital 
markets exist. In a real world with capital constraints and financial frictions, some firms 
may consider a project profitable but they may simply not be able to secure the required 
funds to proceed with the investment.  If the firms are heterogeneous in their access to 
capital, they may behave differently even when facing similar investment opportunities.  
In other words, firms with low financial constraints will invest more aggressively in 
response to changes in the real option value while firms with high financial constraint 
will be less responsive to these changes. Additionally, these financially constrained 
firms will be heavily dependent on any factor that mitigates their financial constraint, 
such as their past earnings and looser credit markets. Consequently, financially 
constrained firms are expected to be more sensitive to past cash flows in their 
investment decisions, whereas firms with less financial constraints are expected to be 
more forward-looking. This will form the second building block of our empirical 
strategy.  
Data limitations are the major obstacles in empirically testing the above 
hypotheses. Ideally, we would prefer to look at the investment activity of all active firms 
in a specific sector, for instance the oil and gas industry. However, majority of these 
firms are not publicly listed companies and as a result they are not required to publicly 
report their balance sheet information and financial statements. Furthermore, limiting 
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ourselves to the smaller universe of publicly listed companies would entail several 
problems. First, the sample size shrinks significantly, which will leave us with very low 
power. Second, focusing on publicly listed companies will pose selection bias.   Third, 
the frequency that the publicly listed companies report their investment activities is at 
best quarterly which will further reduce our tests’ power whereas other market variables 
are easily available in monthly frequency. Last but not the least, a significant number of 
major oil producers are NOCs (National Oil Companies). NOCs are large players in the 
global energy markets, but they often do not make their financial statements available to 
public especially in the developing world countries. These facts increasingly motivate us 
to seek alternative approaches rather than limiting ourselves to publicly listed 
companies. We address data limitations by using general proxies for oil companies’ 
demand for investment, past earnings and access to capital markets. These proxies can 
be used for a vast set of oil companies. This approach enlarges the set of companies in 
our dataset and makes it almost 10 times larger than the set of publicly listed companies. 
To find an appropriate proxy to measure the oil companies’ demand for 
investment, we restrict our attention to offshore projects. We use data on costs of 
developing offshore oil and gas projects to derive a proxy for propensity to invest. 
Developing an offshore field requires drilling thousands of feet below the seabed using 
floating drilling rigs. The oil and gas companies do not usually own these drilling rigs, 
due to high opportunity cost of idle equipment. The daily rental rates for offshore 
drilling rigs are colossal and can reach hundreds of thousands of dollars. According to 
oil industry experts who have been interviewed by the author, the mere rental costs of 
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the drilling rigs can reach 70% of the development cost of oil fields in offshore projects. 
As a result, rental rates of drilling rigs can serve as a proxy for oil and gas companies’ 
capital expenditure.   
We have acquired a novel dataset that contains 15000 detailed rental contracts 
for drilling equipment, which virtually covers all offshore drilling projects during 1999 
to 2010. Specialized service companies own these drilling equipment and rent them out 
to oil and gas companies. Our dataset contains all rental contracts of the offshore drilling 
rigs from 1999 to 2010 with exact contract fixture date, contract start and end dates 
along with equipment technical details, drilling location, operating company, type of 
contract, etc. 
Since the rental cost of this heavy equipment covers the major cost of developing 
an offshore oil field, it is an appropriate proxy for investment costs. Construction of 
these drilling rigs is very time-consuming and can take several years to complete. Thus, 
the supply of this equipment is fixed in the short run. As a result, any short run shift in 
the demand for these rigs will be directly reflected in their rental rate (price). Thus, 
using these rental rates, we can construct a measure of demand for investment by oil 
companies.   
Finding a measure for past earnings proved to be nontrivial as 90% of companies 
in our sample universe are not publicly listed and those which are public companies, do 
not report their earnings on a monthly basis. To obtain a better measure for this variable 
we assume that past earnings of oil companies are highly correlated with the 
corresponding oil prices in the same period. This assumption can be justified if oil 
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companies investing in a new project have a portfolio of relatively similar oil wells. 
Considering the quite advanced technology requirements of offshore drilling and 
essential expertise for entrants to this segment of the market, we believe that this 
assumption is plausible.  
There are more than 500 oil companies in our database; among these, almost 450 
are not publicly listed. We observe that the concentration of publicly listed firms is 
higher in higher water depth and it almost uniformly increases as the water depth 
increases. The higher water depth also corresponds to more costly rental rates simply 
because more advanced technology is required in deeper water. We assume that the 
publicly listed firms have easier access to financial markets because they can issue 
bonds and are well known (Thus they can secure commercial loans more easily). As a 
result, operating in deeper water is partially correlated with lower capital constraints.  
Our results show that as the water depth increases the forward looking effect, 
reflected in the response to futures markets, becomes dominant while the effect of 
financial constraints, measured by dependence on past earnings, decreases. We control 
for a variety of market variables as well as technical and geographical features in our 
econometric model. We try different econometric specifications to test our hypothesis, 
most importantly Fixed Effects Panel data models. We run our analysis for different 
regions of the world, where data is not too limiting, and the results are almost uniformly 
consistent across different regions and specifications. 
Section 2 is dedicated to motivation and the literature review. Section 3 provides 
a simple real options model to provide a theoretical framework for our analysis. Section 
 31 
4 discusses the institutional setting in oil and gas investments and the industry 
background. Section 5 describes the methodology and the data we use. Results are 
discussed in section 6. The paper conclusion is presented in section 7. 
2.2. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND 
Hydrocarbons (crude oil, natural gas, etc) have been the main source of energy in 
daily life during past century and they continue to play a crucial role in the world 
economy. One important feature of oil prices is their high volatility. This is partly 
because of very tight supply and inelastic demand, which help slight interruptions in 
supply or changes in demand create significant fluctuation in oil prices. On the other 
hand, concentration of the majority of petroleum reserves in relatively limited locations, 
specifically OPEC countries, makes energy independence a priority for developed 
countries. There are debates about whether OPEC can effectively exert any market 
power,25 nonetheless developing new energy sources makes the world economy less 
susceptible to supply interruptions such as the ones in Libyan unrest in 2011, the first 
Gulf war in 1991, and the Arab Embargo in 1970s.  
Developing better tools to explain capacity dynamics is inevitable for 
understanding the supply dynamics, which in turn affects prices and volatilities. 
Numerous methods, including Net Present Value (NPV) analysis, have been developed 
to analyze investments. However, unique features of natural resources call for special 
treatment. The exhaustibility of some natural resources like crude oil brings the 
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  Morovati (2010) discusses the OPEC market power and its role and empirically shows that OPEC has in 
fact failed to exert effective collusion in the global crude oil market.  
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intertemporal decision to extract the resource to the core of the investment decision. 
McDonald and Siegel (1986) have shown how the waiting option creates some value 
that should be considered in the cost benefit analysis of the firm.  Real options approach 
has been widely employed to evaluate oil and gas projects as demonstrated in the 
seminal work of Brennan and Shwartz (1985). Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide an 
excellent introduction to the topic in overwhelming details which applies to the general 
issue of investment under uncertainty in different setups. This includes investment on 
capacity building for the extraction of natural resources, which involve several 
uncertainties; from uncertainty about future prices to technological complexities and 
probability of substitute discoveries. In a more recent study, Ronn (2004) identifies the 
critical determinants affecting the timing of oil extraction from an oil field in a real 
options framework as comprising the level of crude-oil forward prices, the slope of the 
forward curve, the volatility of crude-oil prices, and the costs of extracting oil from the 
field in question. 
The majority of the literature, up until recently, lacks sufficient data to 
empirically analyze wide range of natural resource investments. Empirically evaluating 
investments in natural resources requires relatively granular capital expenditure data. 
One of the early examples is Paddock et al. (1988), which exploits data on one of the 
offshore lease auctions in the Gulf of Mexico along with cost estimates from federal 
agencies to apply option valuation on natural resource projects. More recent examples, 
which are the closest to our empirical strategy, are Kellogg (2010) and Gilje and Taillard 
(2012). Both of the above mentioned use data on onshore drilling activity to approach 
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investment analysis. Kellogg (2012) uses a real options model to evaluate Texas onshore 
oil fields and tries to isolate specific types of investments to capture the optionality 
value. Their datasets lacks the price data so the mere “intensity of drilling” measured by 
the number of active firms serves as the proxy for investment. Our dataset in contrast 
gives us the flexibility to evaluate virtually all offshore projects. On the other hand, the 
rental rate data gives us much more precise estimate of investment activity. Gilje and 
Taillard, though closely related, are comparing investment activities of different types of 
firms using drilling activity for natural gas. Their analysis does not focus on the drivers 
of the investments per se but on the differences across two different groups of firms.  
Our dataset is obtained from RigLogix , an energy industry data vendor. This 
unique dataset gives us precise estimates of investment costs in offshore drilling market. 
We employ a theoretical framework, which is an extension of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
giving us strong testable hypotheses. We then test our model using the investment data 
from petroleum industry, coupled with standard financial and macroeconomic data to 
evaluate the main drivers behind the investment decisions of oil and gas companies.  
It is important to notice that we are mainly focusing at the petroleum investments 
by private sector (not the governments). All the investments considered in this paper in 
effect contribute to the capacity building within a competitive fringe, which is price 
taker in crude oil market. The majority of world supply of petroleum is produced in 
Middle East and Russia with extremely low marginal extractions costs. In this research 
we abstract away from price effects of the investments by firms in our database, as their 
size is negligible compared to the dominant players of the market.  
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2.3. REAL OPTIONS MODEL FOR RENTAL RATES  
In this section, we develop a simple real options model to analyze the 
investments in oil and gas capacity building, especially in offshore projects. The 
required large upfront costs and relatively low operating cost makes offshore oil projects 
especially interesting. The model has some simplifying assumptions that depart from 
reality but it provides intuition into the problem and serves as a primer to the unfamiliar 
reader. The more sophisticated model in continuous time using Geometric Brownian 
Motion also yields similar predictions. Since we are not particularly interested in 
estimating a specific model parameterization, we simply rely on this discrete time  
model for comparative statics that will help us construct hypotheses for our empirical 
tests.  
2.3.1. Model Setup 
Consider a risk-neutral price process for a commodity, such as oil, in which the 
uncertainty regarding future prices is resolved after one period and the price remains 
constant afterwards.26 There are two possible future states in the economy: high and low: 
t ∈ {, }. The commodity price at time zero is p and can increase to  =  +  +
		∀ > 0   if the high state of the economy realizes. The price decreases to  =  +
 − 		∀ > 0 if the low state realizes. For the sake of simplicity, assume that these two 
states occur with the same probability so () =  +  or equivalently, the futures 
contract price for these commodity will be  + . Note that  is similar to the level of a 
                                                 
26
 It is important to notice that by making these assumptions we are departing from the traditional 
geometric Brownian motion often assumed for oil prices.  
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drift in a random walk process and  is positively correlated with the variance of the 
expected price. Figure 2.1 provides a graphic representation of the model.  
The potential investor has the option to invest now or wait and invest later. The 
investment is irreversible. Since the uncertainty is resolved at time t=1, it follows that if 
the investor does not find it optimal to invest in period one, it will not be optimal to 
invest in any subsequent period. Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume that 
the investment decision can take place either in period zero or period one.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Timeline of the real options model 
 
Further, assume that undertaking the investment creates capacity that will come 
online next period. In deciding whether to invest or not and when to invest, the investor 
considers the NPV of expected cash flows from different scenarios. Waiting one period 
resolves the uncertainty but the investor will incur the opportunity cost of foregone cash 
flows from period one. On the other hand, investing in period zero may yield positive 
t=0 t=3 t=2 t=1 
kmrp = 		
 +  +  
 
 +  −  
 
 +  +  
 
 +  +  
 
 +  −  
 
 +  −  
 
. . .  k(t = ) = 0.5 
k(t = ) = 0.5 
. . .  
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NPV in expectation but ending up in the low state of the world will impose a loss on the 
firm so it creates a conflicting incentive to delay investments. 
Suppose | denotes the investment costs in period t and that the investors can 
finance their investment costs from capital markets with a loan that incurs per period 
interest rate r. We calculate the NPVs for each of the possible scenarios to find the 
optimal decision to invest or delay investment. $ denotes the net present value of the 
project if the investment takes place at period zero.  
$ = −|$ + 128
 +  + 
(1 + k) 	
=
>
+ 128
+  − 
(1 + k)	
=
>
 
= −I$ + ( + )(1 + k)k 														(2.1) 
 
Note that the expected NPV is calculated by incurring the investment cost at time 
0 and collecting the expected stream of cash flows resulting from the capacity created in 
all subsequent periods.  Similarly,  denotes the net present value of the project, 
calculated at t=0, if the investment takes place in period one when the state of the 
economy is t ∈ {, }. Further assume that if low sate of the economy occurs, the value 
of parameters is such that  < 0	 hence investment is not optimal in bad states. 
 = 11 + k .
1
2 d−| +
( +  + )(1 + k)
k g											 (2.2) 
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Note that the investment costs in next period is a random variable that can 
change, hence  | = $(|) is used which denotes the expectation formed about future 
investment costs given the information available at time 0. 27 
| in offshore drilling industry mainly consists of the rental rate for drilling rigs. 
These rental rates are determined in a competitive market. They should adjust so that 
given all the information available at each point of time, the investors are indifferent 
between investing now or postpone the investment for one period (If this is not the case, 
for example if the investors strictly prefer to postpone their investments, demand for 
drilling rigs decreases, so their demand curve shifts left, their rental rates declines until 
the investors become indifferent.) 
Hence we reach an equilibrium condition in which |$ adjusts such that $ =
 
$ = 																(2.3) 
This equilibrium condition helps us solve for |$ in equilibrium 
⇒	−|$ + ( + )(1 + k)k =
1
1 + k .
1
2 d−| +
( +  + )(1 + k)
k g 
⇒ |$ = ( + )(1 + k)k −
1
1 + k .
1
2 d−| +
( +  + )(1 + k)
k g 
⇒ |$ = ( + )(1 + k)k +
|2(1 + k) −
( +  + )
2k 															(2.4) 
 
                                                 
27In fact, we are allowing for a second source of uncertainty in our model which the risk premium 
associated with it is zero. 
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This equilibrium pricing of drilling rig rates, to the best of our knowledge, has 
been new in the literature and can be extended, given data availability.  
We can do some comparative statics to see how changing different parameters of 
the model affect the rental rates today (which are proxies for Investment costs) 
|$ = 	−
1
2k < 0																																													(2.5) 
|$ =
1 + k
k −
1
2k =
1 + 2k
2k > 0																(2.6) 
|$k = −
 + 
k −
|2(1 + k) +
( +  + )
2k  
=  −  − 2k −
|2(1 + k) < 0																			(2.7) 
2.4. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
2.4.1. Drilling Industry 
Large deposits of hydrocarbons may be available deep under the surface of the 
earth in different forms such as crude oil, natural gas, etc. These stocks are often 
underground deposits of hydrocarbons trapped within porous rocks under immense 
pressure. A majority of conventional oil and gas production projects involve drilling an 
oil well into this high-pressure reservoir and the resource simply starts flowing, at least 
during the early stages of production, due to its high pressure. A tract of land or sea that 
contains oil reservoirs is referred to as oil field,28 usually extending several miles across. 
                                                 
28
 Most of the hydrocarbon reservoirs contain both oil and gas. If the hydrocarbon reservoir mainly 
contains natural gas, the field is called gas field. In the rest of this paper, we will simply refer to crude 
oil for much of our study but our results are easily extended to natural gas as well. In fact, in most of the 
conventional hydrocarbon reservoirs both oil, gas and sour water are trapped under a dome like hard 
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Extracting the resources out of the deep reservoirs requires sophisticated techniques 
depending on several factors including the geology of the oil field and the type of 
resource. In the conventional form of oil reservoirs, which is still the far dominant 
source of energy in the world economy, extraction requires drilling one or several wells 
into the reservoirs, which occasionally lie several thousand feet below the surface of the 
earth. Once the wells are completed, crude oil usually starts flowing out. Because of this 
outflow, the pressure within the reservoir starts to fall, which may necessitate artificial 
lifting techniques for further production, often referred to as Enhanced Oil Recovery 
(EOR).  At current available technologies, a fraction of existing oil and gas is 
recoverable even with most advanced EOR methods and the majority of the reserve will 
remain under the ground.  
The crucial step in bringing a hydrocarbon field into production, or so called 
“development” of a hydrocarbon field, is the advanced techniques of drilling appropriate 
wells. The wells, occasionally less than a foot in diameter, often pass through several 
thousand feet of rocks to reach the reservoir.29  
                                                                                                                                                 
rock surface, deep under the ground. Although the oil production form unconventional reservoirs like 
tar sands or shale oil has recently been on the rise, nonetheless more than 95% of current oil production 
of the world remains from conventional resources. Natural gas is entirely different mostly because 
prohibitively large transportation costs prevent it to be transferred easily across different regions of the 
world. As a result, there is no unified market for natural gas and it is traded regionally. Interestingly, 
shale gas revolution in USA, which employs a technological breakthrough to free up large deposits of 
unconventional natural gas reservoirs, has transformed the natural gas industry in North America (See 
Martin et al., 2012 for more details about Shale Gas Revolution and its economic consequences and 
Morovati (2013) for an empirical evaluation of shale gas revolution on US manufacturing). This 
increase in supply has caused a severe drop in the price of natural gas in the US market, which in turn 
has deep consequences on energy markets as a whole. However, much of our discussions remain valid 
specifically about crude oil. We will consider the shale gas revolution as an exogenous shock to the 
market and briefly discuss how we can observe its consequences in our empirical results.  
29
 Recent advances in drilling techniques has been a major enabling component of shale gas revolution. 
Horizontal drilling, once beyond imagination, requires directing the drilling bit, thousands of feet under 
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2.4.2. Offshore production 
Although there are large oil fields both onshore and offshore, the upfront costs 
for developing offshore oil production facilities are often larger. Drilling in offshore 
environments takes place to tap into the hydrocarbon resources captured under the 
seabed. Offshore drilling often requires technologies that are more sophisticated. It also 
requires additional protective measures to mitigate the risks involved such as 
environmental risks, severe weather risks and potential petroleum leaks.  The remote 
locations and harsher environment create challenges and much of the costs associated 
with developing offshore oil fields are due to overcoming these challenges. The 
DeepWater Horizon disaster in April 2010 provides an example of the immense 
potential risks involved. This drilling rig exploded leading to leakage of several 
thousand barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico totaling at about 5 million barrels of oil. 
The explosion of the drilling rig is estimated to cost BP, which was the operator of the 
rig at the time, more than $40 billion in cleanup costs and lawsuits. The costs are still 
rising.30  
2.4.2.1. Acquiring the Drilling Right 
In much of the developing countries the drilling right falls within the hands of 
the state. The National Oil Companies undertake large investments and no other entity 
can obtain the right to development. Major examples include the Persian Gulf petroleum 
states. In contrast to the developing world, the rich countries’ governments do not 
                                                                                                                                                 
the surface, to make a vertical turn and penetrate the hydrocarbon layers, often parallel to the earth 
surface. 
30
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/nov/15/bp-fine-draw-line-deepwater 
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directly get involved in producing crude oil and natural gas. The right to development of 
an oil field either is inherently for the owner of the land or is offered to private 
companies through a competitive bidding process. The entity with the right to 
development may develop the field and earn cash flows from selling the resource if the 
investment is successful. The government earns taxes and royalties from natural 
resources.  
For an specific example we turn our attention to the details of the bidding 
procedures in the Gulf of Mexico. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management31 (BOEM) 
is responsible for managing and administering the petroleum production in the federal 
regions of the Gulf of Mexico. BOEM has divided the Gulf of Mexico into a blocks grid, 
each containing several square miles, usually in the form of rectangular tract.32 Energy 
companies can perform seismic analysis in advance to evaluate the potential chance of 
hydrocarbon discovery in each tract. BOEM offers a set of tracts for sale and energy 
companies can compete in the bidding process to win the lease. The winning bid pays 
the sale price and obtains the right but not the obligation to start developing the 
petroleum field for certain period of time, usually 5 or 8 years. If a company starts 
developing a field, it keeps the right to production from that field for as long as it wishes 
to pay the associated fees and royalties. If a lease owner decides to abandon a tract and 
not to develop it after the expiration of the lease, the tract will return to the stock of 
BOEM tracts and becomes available for potential future auctions.   
                                                 
31
 BOEM.gov 
32
 For a precise map of the grid blocks please download the following pdf file 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Mapping_and_Data/visual
1.pdf 
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The tract lease is analogous to a call option. To own the lease the winning bid 
has to pay certain fees, similar to the price of a call option. Owning the lease gives the 
owner the right but not the obligation to start drilling in order to make the lease 
productive and create future streams of income. The owner will only start developing if 
she finds the development worthwhile or in other words finds the expected future cash 
flows more valuable than the development costs. There exists a threshold in the 
discounted expected value of the future cash flows above which the lease owner pays the 
drilling costs and develops the field to earn the future cash flows. The development cost 
is similar to the strike price of a call option and the discounted expected future cash 
flows is analogous to the value of the underlying asset in a call option.  
2.4.2.2. Institutional Settings in Drilling Rig Market 
Offshore drilling rigs are huge mobile equipment that are used to drill wells in 
the seabed to reach the petroleum reservoirs. Figure 2.1 illustrates different types of 
offshore drilling rigs, employed for different water depths. Figure 2.2 demonstrates a 
sample drilling rig in operation. This equipment is usually owned by petroleum service 
companies (e.g. Transocean) and rented out to oil companies (e.g. BP). The daily rental 
rates are often fixed at the contract fixture date but in some rare cases that the contract 
duration is several years it is indexed to the rental rates of a similar equipment portfolio.  
Table 2.1 shows a summary statistics of the rental rates for our database. The daily 
rental rates can be as high as $700000 which can easily reach $100 million in drilling 
costs for a drilling job that lasts 4-5 months. Offshore projects require large upfront 
investments to yield an uncertain production rate in future which can generate cash 
 43 
flows for the investor. The major cost of developing an offshore oil field is the rental 
cost of drilling rigs which reaches 60-70% of total development cost for ultra deep 
projects. We use this fact to construct our measure of investment costs in the offshore oil 
and gas industry. 
 
Figure 2.2:  An illustration of different types of drilling rigs 
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Figure 2.3: Semisub Drilling Rig in Operation 
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Figure 2.4: Semisub Drilling Rig en Route to new location. To better appreciate the size 
of this drilling rig, note the size of the 6-story building on the deck of the 
carrier vessel towards the front of the carrier ship.  
 
Offshore drilling rigs are often contracted for short periods of time usually from 
several weeks to months. They are transferred to the drilling location, perform their 
drilling task and finally removed from the location and transferred to the location of 
their next drilling job. Once the drilling equipment is removed from the project location, 
the production facility is installed which will permanently remain on site.  
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Mean 101 
Median 60 
Mode 55 
Standard Deviation 107 
Maximum 703 
99th percentile 510 
1st percentile 10 
Table 2.1:  Summary statistics for drilling rigs costs: Daily Rental Rates ($ Thousand). 33 
 
A drilling rig in the process of being transferred to a new location has been 
demonstrated. Although drilling rigs can in theory be transferred to anywhere, the high 
opportunity costs of the time spent on long routes effectively creates regional markets 
within which the drilling rigs are employed for offshore projects in a relatively 
competitive market. The relative isolation of each region is one reason that wide 
differences in the rental rates of similar drilling rigs may be observed in the short run 
across different regions of the world. New entry due to construction of the new rigs and 
movability of rigs across regions will reduce this gap in the long run but it may not be 
fully eliminated merely because of other factors such as geopolitical and climate 
differences and market concentration.  
                                                 
33
 Notice that this is an unconditional distribution of the rental rates to give a quick idea about the industry. 
Clearly the distribution will be much tighter when a drilling decision is to be made as the potential 
candidate rigs will be in a subset of the distribution. 
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There are several service companies present in any of major oil and gas 
producing regions of the world such as Gulf of Mexico, North Sea (between UK and 
Norway), Persian Gulf, West Africa, etc. The largest drilling companies in the Gulf of 
Mexico with aggregate market share of about 60% are Transocean, ENSCO, Diamond 
Offshore, Noble Drilling and Rowan. The largest market share belongs to Transocean 
with 15% of 5570 contracts. In addition to the above companies, which are the most 
active firms in the Gulf of Mexico, three other service companies are also among top 8 
drilling companies: Parker Drilling, Pride International, GlobalSantaFe. The top eight 
own 65% of the overall market share. As evident in the market concentrations, though 
far from perfect competition, the market for drilling equipment is not highly 
concentrated and prices are not substantially different from overall costs, both explicit 
and implicit.  
The Industry appendix includes more details about the market concentration, the 
profile of the most active drilling companies, active drilling rigs and different drilling rig 
types.  
2.5. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Constructing an empirical test of our real options model requires a dataset that 
contains observations on investment costs, investors’ expectations about future prices, 
measures for tightness of capital markets and the riskiness of the future cash flows. To 
justify using the real options framework the empirical setup should also fulfill the basic 
assumptions of irreversibility of the investment and discretion of the investor over the 
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timing of the investment. In this section, these conditions and data features are 
discussed.  
Real options approach is a useful theoretical framework to analyze a wide range 
of natural resource investments, especially developing an offshore oil and gas field. As 
described in the industry section, energy companies acquire the right to development of 
certain block in the sea through a competitive bidding process. They obtain the right but 
not the obligation to develop the field. After gathering further information through 
geological tests, they decide whether to go ahead with the investment or postpone it until 
the right time. If they decide to develop the field, they usually rent a drilling rig from 
service companies to perform the drilling.  
Publicly listed oil and gas companies are required by governmental regulations 
to make their balance sheets available. Their capital expenditure can be used as a 
measure of investment costs accrued by these firms. However, using the balance sheet 
data imposes some serious limitations on our analysis. First, the frequency of publicly 
available data on capital expenditure is very low (annually for most cases) which given 
the low number of public E&P firms, enormously decrease the power of our tests. 
Second, the published data on Capex is on an aggregate level and does not specify each 
investment opportunity. Investments on a refinery, pipeline, expansion of current 
production plant or developing a new field are all aggregated together which makes it 
impossible to identify the determinant factors of developing a new investment 
opportunity. Third, there are several other smaller private companies that do not publish 
their balance sheets. Our novel dataset allows us to evaluate investments at the smallest 
 49 
unit of investment in oil industry which is an oil well.  The rental cost of drilling 
equipment construct the majority of the cost of developing an oil field (According to 
petroleum experts, 60% to 70% of developing an offshore oil field is just the cost of 
drilling).  We exploit this unique dataset of offshore drilling equipment to empirically 
test our real options model. The dataset contains details of the all offshore drilling 
contracts between service companies and oil companies during 1999-2010. The 
contracts include the name of the service company who owned the rig, the name of the 
oil company that rented the equipment, the contract start and end dates and the rental 
rates. The dataset also includes the fixture date of each contract, the region and the 
location of the drilling, and the rated water depth. The technical specifications and rig 
type allow us to follow each group of the rigs with utmost precision.34  
The dataset includes almost 15000 contracts for the period 1999-2010. There are 
290 oil companies active in our database among which 23 have been identified to be 
either a publicly listed firm or a subsidiary of a publicly listed one. If we were to restrict 
our attention to the public companies, we would lose more than 90% of the firms in our 
sample, though the public subset of the firms in the dataset are more active on average 
hence resulting in losing much less than 90% of observations.  
The drilling data consists of more than 1000 drilling rigs which have repeatedly 
entered into contracts hence unavailable and become available after the contract was 
over, hence entering the market again. We abstract away from analyzing the optionality 
                                                 
34
 A detailed description of the data fields present in our data can be found at the data vendor’s website: 
http://www.riglogix.com/RigLogix_Data.aspx 
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on the supply side of the drilling market for simplicity. Our units of observations are 
contracts that these drilling rigs frequently engage in so each rig appears several times 
on our observations.  
The concentration of the publicly listed companies is higher in deeper water. 
This can be mainly attributed to the more technological sophistication and higher 
required investment costs which is prohibitive to the smaller companies. Large and 
public firms can access the capital markets more easily and face less financial frictions. 
To evaluate the effect of financial constraints on the firms in our sample we divide our 
sample into three different water depths. We run our tests on each bin separately in order 
to identify the effect of financial frictions.  
Drilling rigs are heavy machinery and they are in fixed supply in the short-run. 
Hence, any changes in the rental rates can be inferred as the change in the value of the 
option to wait.  
As described in the model section, the rental rates will adjust such that in 
equilibrium firms are indifferent between investing now or postpone their investment. In 
other words, the value of the option to wait should go to zero. Using this simple 
intuition, we can use the comparative statics results of our model to construct our 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis (1): The option value decreases as expected future prices increase, 
hence the rental rates should increase as the slope of the futures contracts increase.  
Hypothesis (2): The option value increase as interest rates increase, hence the 
rental rates should decrease as the cost of financing the project increases.  
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Hypothesis (3): The option value increase as uncertainty about future increase, 
hence the rental rates should decrease as the riskiness of future cash flows increases. 
Hypothesis (4): In the absence of perfect capital markets, firms will be more 
dependent on their past earnings for financing their projects. As a result, firms with 
higher financial constraint will respond more severely to variations in past earnings. 
This will in turn lead to more significant change in the rental rates in the corresponding 
segments of the market.  
To test these hypotheses we use a fixed effects panel data model. The advantage 
of the panel data  models is that it allows us to keep track of unobserved characteristics 
of each rig throughout the analysis. This is particularly of interest because we can’t 
control for all technical details of the drilling rigs. We use the following panel data 
model specification: 
| = z +  	 + {r +  															(2.8) 
where:  
 |: Rental cost of rig i at time t 
 : Contract specific characteristics for rig i at time t 
 : Market variables at time t, e.g past earnings, slope of futures curves, etc  
 r: 	Rig specific unobserved effect 
 : i.i.d. error term 
For each observation (contract), we use the contract specific control variables 
such as the length of the contracts, the contract type (fixed length, fixed work), etc. We 
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also look up the market variables at the time of contract fixture date which are either 
directly related to our tests or as controls for our regressions. 
The slope of the futures contracts with different maturities is our proxy for 
expected futures prices. If markets are efficient aggregators of available information 
(efficient market hypothesis), every innovation in supply and demand that can be 
anticipated will be reflected in futures contracts prices. Hence, futures curves slope serve 
as our proxy for expected price increase in different time horizons (maturities). It is 
important to notice that a futures curve in backwardation does not necessarily imply that 
expected prices are anticipated to decline in future. However, all else equal, a higher 
futures price implies a higher expected future spot price.  
A large number of firms in our sample (more than 90%) are private companies 
and their balance sheet data is not available. However, given the properties of the 
industry, we can construct a measure of past earnings. Offshore projects are relatively 
complicated and prior onshore exploration activity seems to be a necessary step to avoid 
high failure costs. Entrants to offshore projects are often involved in several other 
smaller projects elsewhere and own a portfolio of producing oil wells. Hence, we take a 
moving average of crude oil prices35 during past six months as a proxy for their past 
earnings.  
Ideally, we would wish to have exact data on borrowing costs of active firms in 
our sample. Yet since this is not easily available, we revert to aggregate measures for 
                                                 
35
 We use West Texas Intermediate (WTI) throughout this research because of the widespread trading of 
WTI futures.  
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overall conditions of capital markets. We use 10-year treasury bill yield as a measure of 
risk free rate of interest because using short-term treasury bills yields would cause 
serious endogeneity problems as it is a policy tool that is manipulated by the Federal 
Reserve. We use the excess yield of 3-month-to-maturity investment grade bonds over 
treasury bills of the same maturity to capture the excess cost of capital the companies 
have to incur to access financing.36   
We obtain the implied volatility of crude oil prices from Bloomberg Terminal. 
These implied volatilities are derived using a Black-Scholes options valuation model of 
futures contract of WTI crude oil for delivery in 6 months. We pick 6 month horizon 
because the longer horizon options are thinly traded so they are less liquid. The options 
for shorter horizons are usually too noisy as they are closely affected by day to day 
trading activities.   
In addition to implied volatility, we use historical volatility of futures contracts 
as an alternative measure for volatility. To construct this measure we obtain the standard 
deviation of futures contract prices for WTI crude oil over a 30-day window. It is 
important to notice that implied volatility is inherently forward looking.  In contrast, the 
historical volatility is a reflector of past events. However, since historical volatility is 
readily accessible to more investors and the liquidity concerns involved with thin trading 
volumes in futures options is absent, we include this alternative measure in our empirical 
analysis as well.  
                                                 
36
 Note that 90% of firms in our database are not publicly listed companies. However, the spread described 
above simply captures the tightness of credit markets for a range of companies active in the industry.  
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2.6. RESULTS 
The empirical results are presented in this section. We take natural logarithm of 
all variables,37 where feasible, so the results should be interpreted as percentage changes 
in investment activity as a result of one percentage change in independent variables. We 
present our estimation results for the whole sample as well as important regions such as 
Gulf of Mexico and North Sea in Europe. Although the results are slightly different 
across different regions, they are generally consistent with our four hypotheses. 
Table 2.2 presents the estimation results for the Gulf of Mexico region. This 
region has the most contract details and very few missing values. This can be attributed 
to overall better quality of data in USA and transparency in procedures and regulations.  
Expected futures prices as demonstrated by the slope of futures curve has a 
positive and significant effect and this effect is almost uniform across different water 
depth, consistent with hypothesis (1), which states that the option value decreases as 
expected future prices increase, hence the rental rates should increase as the slope of the 
futures contracts increase. 
Our results do not reject our hypothesis (3) about the effect of implied volatility. 
Considering our fixed effects panel model, we are in fact lacking enough power neither 
to reject nor to accept this hypothesis.  However, as it is illustrated in Table 4, when we 
include all observations in the world regression, in some cases the coefficient on implied 
volatility becomes negative and significant as predicted in Hypothesis (3). 
                                                 
37
 Our dependent variable, rental rate, is a measure of investment costs for developing new oil fields. This 
variable has a wide range across different rig types and water depth. However, the variation is much 
smaller within each group of the rig types. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
Past Earnings  1.323*** 1.400*** 1.207*** 0.962*** 
 (14.937) (15.011) (11.001) (3.885) 
 
Slope of futures curve  0.460*** 0.447*** 0.468*** 0.435** 
 (5.078) (5.032) (4.692) (2.038) 
 
Cost of capital -0.198*** -0.208*** -0.184*** -0.116 
 (-4.099) (-4.105) (-3.180) (-1.195) 
 
Implied volatility  0.005 0.023 -0.109 0.134 
 (0.038) (0.174) (-0.795) (0.708) 
     
CONTROLS  Y Y Y Y 
FIXED EFFECTS Y Y Y Y 
TIME CLUSTERS Y Y Y Y 
     
# of Observations 3,354 2,153 869 332 
R-squared 0.870 0.851 0.818 0.792 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Fixed Effects Panel 
Table 2.2:  Estimation results for the Gulf of Mexico region. Models (1)-(4) correspond 
to different water depth as follows: (1) All rigs; (2) Shallow water with 
maximum water depth <350 feet; (3) Medium depth with maximum water 
depth between 4000 feet and 350 feet; and (4) Deep water with maximum 
water depth > 4000 feet,  
 
Hypothesis (3) states that the option value increases as interest rates increase, 
hence the rental rates should decrease as the slope of the cost of financing the project 
increases. As evident in Table 2.2, this hypothesis is not rejected. However, it is 
interesting to notice that although the effect is negative and significant for medium and 
shallow water depth, it is statistically insignificant for deep water. This can be another 
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sign that the larger companies have less financial constraints in their investment 
decisions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
Past Earnings  0.926*** 1.051*** 0.795*** 0.345** 
 (6.776) (6.159) (4.316) (2.615) 
 
Slope of futures curve  0.647*** 0.666*** 0.653*** 0.164 
 (4.291) (2.855) (3.416) (0.438) 
 
Cost of capital -0.083 -0.016 -0.106 -0.149 
 (-0.843) (-0.126) (-0.983) (-0.660) 
 
Implied volatility  -0.248 -0.270 -0.262 0.192 
 (-1.594) (-1.221) (-1.473) (0.584) 
 
CONTROLS  Y Y Y Y 
FIXED EFFECTS Y Y Y Y 
TIME CLUSTERS Y Y Y Y 
     
# of Observations 790 281 467 42 
R-squared 0.757 0.701 0.769 0.829 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2.3: Estimation results for the North Sea region. Models (1)-(4) correspond to 
different water depth as follows: (1) All rigs; (2) Shallow water with 
maximum water depth  less than 350 feet; (3) Medium depth with maximum 
water depth between 4000 feet and 350 feet; and (4) Deep water with 
maximum water depth  more than 4000 feet 
 
Past earnings have a positive effect across all water depth. However, consistent 
with our hypothesis (4), with an increase in water depth, which coincides with higher 
concentration of publicly listed companies, the dependence on past earnings decreases. 
This captures the higher cost of external financing for smaller firms and illustrates the 
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effect of financial friction on firms with lower access to capital. Table 2.5 present the 
results for the Gulf of Mexico with historical volatilities used as a measure for volatility. 
The historical volatility is calculated based on the standard deviation of 12 month 
futures prices over a 30 day window.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
Past Earnings  0.906*** 0.962*** 0.874*** 0.769*** 
 (12.903) (13.099) (9.798) (5.143) 
 
Slope of futures curve  0.440*** 0.425*** 0.465*** 0.455*** 
 (5.077) (5.080) (4.560) (2.823) 
 
Cost of capital -0.192*** -0.190*** -0.206*** -0.092 
 (-4.896) (-4.998) (-4.047) (-1.360) 
 
Implied volatility  -0.056 0.020 -0.249** 0.068 
 (-0.613) (0.201) (-2.502) (0.434) 
 
CONTROLS  Y Y Y Y 
FIXED EFFECTS Y Y Y Y 
TIME CLUSTERS Y Y Y Y 
     
# of Observations 7,123 4,211 2,110 802 
R-squared 0.865 0.842 0.819 0.856 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Fixed Effects Panel 
Table 2.4: Estimation results for the whole world. Models (1)-(4) correspond to different 
water depth as follows: (1) All rigs; (2) Shallow water with maximum water 
depth  less than 350 feet; (3) Medium depth with maximum water depth 
between 4000 feet and 350 feet; and (4) Deep water with maximum water 
depth more than 4000 feet 
 
 58 
Table 2.3 present the results for the North Sea which is an petroleum region in 
Europe, mainly shared between UK and Norway.  Similar overall trends can be 
identified although because of much less observations, the results are less significant. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Shallowwater: medium depth: Deep water 
VARIABLES All rigs max wd <350 4000> max wd > 
350 
max wd > 
4000 
     
Past Earnings 1.365*** 1.551*** 1.110*** 0.679*** 
 (11.371) (10.204) (9.171) (3.631) 
Oil Price -0.743*** -0.584*** -0.807*** -1.358*** 
 (-4.818) (-3.173) (-4.466) (-4.100) 
Future 1 Year 1.084*** 0.806*** 1.334*** 2.040*** 
 (4.996) (3.219) (5.712) (4.289) 
Cost of Capital -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.156*** -0.054 
 (-3.767) (-3.197) (-3.261) (-0.787) 
Historical Volatility -0.166*** -0.147** -0.205*** -0.179** 
of Futures Contracts 
 
(-2.871) (-1.999) (-4.149) (-2.412) 
CONTROLS  Y Y Y Y 
FIXED EFFECTS Y Y Y Y 
TIME CLUSTERS Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3,843 2,456 1,017 370 
R-squared 0.884 0.869 0.825 0.822 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Fixed Effects Panel 
Table 2.5:  Estimation results for the Gulf of Mexico region with historical volatility. 
Models (1)-(4) correspond to different water depth as follows: (1) All rigs; 
(2) Shallow water with maximum water depth <350 feet; (3) Medium depth 
with maximum water depth between 4000 feet and 350 feet; and (4) Deep 
water with maximum water depth > 4000 feet, 
Table 2.5 presents the results for the whole sample. The coefficients are in 
general consistent with previous tables. The only noticeable difference is that the 
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implied volatility for medium water has become significant in the complete sample. As 
discussed earlier, this is mainly due to the increased power of our tests in the presence of 
more observations.  
We repeat our estimation with longer maturity futures contracts such as 24 
month and the results are generally similar to 12 month maturity. However, it is 
important to notice as the maturities become longer, the traded volume decreases and the 
contracts become less liquid hence the price discovery role of the reported quotes may 
be diluted.  
2.7. CONCLUSION 
Unique characteristics of exhaustible natural resources such as irreversibility and 
exhaustibility necessitate distinctive approaches in evaluating related investment 
projects. In this paper, real options approach was employed to evaluate investment 
decisions of oil and gas companies in an empirical setup. Our real options model, though 
simple, provides powerful insights into the problem and equips us with a theoretical 
framework.  
Data limitations encouraged us to use innovative methods to attack the 
investment analysis problem, which nonetheless, require some assumptions to bridge 
between available data and our desired variables. Exploiting the fact that crude oil is a 
commodity, we assumed that past prices can serve as a proxy for past earnings. 
Considering the institutional settings in the drilling industry and our equilibrium pricing 
of the drilling equipment, we are able to construct our panel data model specification. 
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Our empirical results are generally consistent with our hypothesis. Nonetheless, 
the effect of uncertainty on the investments of oil and gas companies is not fully 
captured in our model as expected. Finding better proxies for future uncertainty and 
better controls, which could increase the power of our tests, remains an open task for 
future research.  
Our theoretical model needs to be expanded to capture more aspects of the 
investment decisions of oil companies, specifically the effect of financial frictions. 
Finally, our investment dataset includes up to end of 2010. To have a better picture of 
the effect of 2008 financial crisis on the investments, we need to obtain updates to our 
database to include more of the post 2008 crisis so that we can split our sample into two 
distinct periods, before and after the crisis. We suspect that updated data will give us 
interesting new insights into the dynamics of offshore investment in petroleum projects.  
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Chapter 3: Effect of Shale Gas Revolution on U.S. Energy-Intensive 
Manufacturing 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent technological advances in natural gas production have made large deposits 
of untapped natural gas reserves available for extraction, which in turn caused a steep 
decline in U.S. natural gas prices during past decade. Rapid and unexpected 
improvements in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing have made natural gas 
production from huge shale beds economically viable, creating an unprecedented natural 
gas production boom, often referred to as “Shale Gas Revolution” or “Shale Rush”.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: U.S. energy production by fuel (1980-2040) 
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Energy industry experts’ estimates of recoverable natural gas in USA, which has 
been in steady decline during past few decades, have suddenly increased significantly to 
the point that Energy Information Administration predicts that USA will become a net 
exporter of natural gas by 2020. 
Transportation of natural gas is relatively costly. Unlike crude oil that can be 
transported via large tankers, natural gas is mostly transported using pipelines or in the 
form of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), both of which require large infrastructural 
investments. This creates isolated markets in different regions of the world allowing for 
large price dispersions in different markets. The United States and Canada are connected 
through a large and geographically broad network of pipelines hence natural gas prices 
are highly correlated within North America. However, transportation of natural gas 
across oceans is prohibitively expensive and capital intensive. This makes natural gas 
markets and its price dynamics completely different from crude oil.  
 
Figure 3.2: Average wellhead natural gas price in U.S. 1996-2011. (Source: EIA) 
$0.00
$2.00
$4.00
$6.00
$8.00
$10.00
year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Average Wellhead Natural Gas Price in U.S.  
(per mBTU)
Natural Gas - Wellhead prices / mBTU
 63 
In contrast to crude oil which has highly correlated prices, natural gas prices may 
differ significantly across the world. In North America, natural gas sells for around $4 per 
million British thermal units (mBTU) while in Europe it costs around $12 mBTU and it 
may reach up to $20 mBTU in Asia. This gap has specially widened recently because of 
increased shale gas production which caused the prices of natural gas to decline 
significantly in U.S.  
Natural gas serves as a major source of energy for a variety of energy intensive 
industries such as Iron and steel, rubber and plastic products, foundries, chemical 
processing units, glass blowing factories and paper production. Wide dispersion of 
natural gas prices in different regions of the world can become a significant competitive 
advantage for firms that have access to this input factor at a cheaper rate. These industries 
have been losing their competitive advantage to countries with low labor cost. Hence, a 
small cost advantage may increase their competitive advantage and even reverse the 
offshoring trend of energy intensive industries. A recent report from Boston Consulting 
Group (BCG), “U.S. Manufacturing Nears the Tipping Point: Which Industries, Why, 
and How Much?” identifies seven industry groups including energy intensive industries 
such as plastic & rubber products and fabricated metal products that are at a tipping point 
and may become competitive within United States in near future, given the changing 
scene of global economy.  
Energy intensive manufacturing companies certainly prefer lower natural gas 
prices, but energy companies are suffering from historically low natural gas prices so 
they are pushing for obtaining LNG export licenses to benefit from price dispersions 
between U.S. and the rest of the world, especially Europe and Asia. Obama 
administration has issued the first such licenses to Cheniere Energy in March 2012, 
planning to start exporting LNG in 2015. A second license has been issued in June 2013. 
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The long delay between these two licenses is partly due to debates between opponents 
and supporters of natural gas exports. If the barriers to export is removed, the U.S. natural 
gas producers will gain as the prices will get closer to that of Europe and Asia, although it 
will remain at least $5 lower than any export destination, due to conversion and 
transportation costs given currently available technologies. The energy intensive 
industries will clearly lose in this scenario, hence they are fiercely lobbying for restricting 
LNG export permits to help domestic manufacturing survive global competition, 
obviously at natural gas producers’ loss.  
American Chemistry Council (ACC) has recently published two reports about the 
effect of Shale Gas discoveries on U.S. manufacturing arguing that low natural gas prices 
will help ailing U.S. manufacturing sector to recover. In “Shale Gas, Competitiveness 
and New U.S. Investment: A Case Study of Eight Manufacturing Industries” ACC 
concludes that if U.S. natural gas prices continue to remain lower than $5/mBTU, 
resulting competitive advantage will spur more than $72 billion of new investments in 
energy intensive manufacturing and 1.2 million new jobs in U.S. over the next decade.  
The purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of low natural gas prices 
on energy intensive U.S. manufacturing industries using widely available data. I 
empirically evaluate the stock market reactions of publicly traded companies to arrival of 
new information about the evolution of the cost of an input factor in future, namely 12-
month natural gas futures contracts prices. 
Futures contracts are signed between two parties for delivery of a specified good 
at certain point of time in future at agreed upon price. The commodities futures contracts 
are widely traded and help the two parties avoid price risks or hedge their investments. It 
also aggregates and reflects the available information in the market about suspected price 
shocks in the future. For instance, discovery of a new gas reserve that will come on line 
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in two years will be comprehended by the industry experts, who have the knowledge and 
expertise about the industry. They can predict the effect of the new discovery on prices 
after the newly discovered reserves start production. As a result, they will have incentive 
to sell more 2-year futures contracts to lock in higher prices at the maturity date of their 
contracts. The increased supply of 2-year futures contracts will reduce the prices of these 
contracts. Hence, assuming that the markets are efficient, any newly available 
information will be reflected in futures contracts prices. Even non-experts can rely on 
futures contracts –and the evolution of their prices– as a gauge of what the informed 
market players believe about the innovation of prices.  Thus, futures contracts also play 
an important role as aggregators of available information in the market.  
The buyer of a futures contract may gain or lose because of the arrival of new 
information. If new natural gas resources are discovered and market players believe that 
the price of natural gas will decline, the long term contract with a future maturity date 
will be less valuable hence the buyer will lose from the arrival of new information. 
Similarly, if new information is revealed indicating that the prices are expected to rise, 
the value of a futures contract at hand will increase and its owner will gain from expected 
upward movements in the market.38 
Both manufacturers and stock market participants who are interested in learning 
about expected future prices of natural gas but lack the knowledge and expertise to 
analyze the energy markets in detail, can take note from the evolution of these futures 
contracts prices. My hypothesis is that if natural gas prices are significant factors in the 
core competiveness of energy intensive industries, the stock prices of these companies 
should react negatively to positive price innovations of futures contracts as these positive 
                                                 
38
 The exact amount of return that one obtains from engaging in these contracts will depend on the margin 
limits for these contracts, which may be variable in different circumstances but are mostly in 5%-10% 
range. 
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shocks are indicative of an increase in expected price in future. The direction of the price 
innovations and their magnitude can be perceived by considering the unanticipated 
gains/losses in buying these contracts and holding them over time. 
To obtain a measure of these unanticipated gains/losses arising from buying 
natural gas futures contracts, I construct a time series of gains/losses from buying and 
holding these contracts. If these gains are positive, there has been an unanticipated news 
in the market regarding the future prices of the underlying commodity, namely natural 
gas. Hence, the stock market participants can benefit from the information aggregation 
role of futures markets to learn about the future profitability of energy intensive 
industries. If the price of natural gas is in fact a substantial element in profitability of 
these industries, it will in turn be reflected in the stock value of the corresponding 
companies.  
To test this hypothesis, I regress the monthly stock returns of energy intensive 
industries39 on the gains/losses from buying 13-month natural gas futures contracts and 
holding them for one month. I control for Fama-French three factors to account for 
common risk factors that may affect the stock returns.  To better present the effect of 
natural gas I divide the energy intensive industries into highly energy intensive and 
moderately energy intensive industries using a measure constructed from estimates by 
Energy Information Administration and Census Bureau.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, an introduction the 
institutional setup and background of the research is presented which includes a quick 
overview of shale gas revolution, the market for natural gas futures contracts and a 
discussion of energy intensive industries. Section 3 is dedicated to discussing the 
                                                 
39
 I will discuss the selection process of these companies in more detail.  
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empirical strategy. I describe the data in section 4. The discussion of the results are 
presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper with some suggestions for 
extending this research project. 
 
3.2. BACKGROUND AND INSTITUTIONAL SETUP 
3.2.1 Shale Gas Revolution 
The estimates for total natural gas reserves by Energy Information Administration 
shows that in 1970’s the total natural dry gas reserves in U.S. was around 280 TCF which 
declined to 160 TCF in 2000. Recent technological advances in natural gas production 
have made large deposits of untapped natural gas reserves available for extraction hence 
increasing the total dry natural gas reserves to more than 350 TCF in 2012.  This has 
caused a steep decline in U.S. natural gas prices during past decade. The revolution has 
been even more astonishing in shale gas reserves. National Petroleum Council’s 2003  
estimate of technically recoverable shale gas reserves was around 38 trillion cubic feet 
(TCF) while the lower bound of more recent estimates are around 600 TCF (out of U.S. 
total natural gas reserves of 2500 TCF).  
Unconventional natural gas resources have been geologically present and widely 
studied. However, the prohibitively high extraction costs have made them economically 
infeasible to extract given the existing technologies. Rapid and unexpected improvements 
in horizontal drilling coupled with hydraulic fracturing techniques have made natural gas 
production from huge shale beds economically viable. The learning curve effect of 
implementing more and more of these type of production procedures has reduced the 
extraction costs, bringing in more production on line, creating an unprecedented natural 
gas production boom, often referred to as “Shale Gas Revolution” or “Shale Rush”.  
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Energy industry experts’ estimates of recoverable natural gas in USA, which has 
been in steady decline during past few decades, have suddenly increased significantly to 
the point that Energy Information Administration predicts that USA will become a net 
exporter of natural gas by 2020. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Natural Gas Production by Source, 1990-2040 (trillion cubic feet) Source: 
EIA (2012) 
Transportation of natural gas is relatively costly compared to other types of fossil 
fuels. Unlike crude oil that can be transported via large tankers, natural gas is mostly 
transported using pipelines or in the form of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). The United 
States and Canada are connected through a large and geographically broad network of 
pipelines. However, building pipelines require large investment and maintenance costs 
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and is not economically viable for transportation of natural gas across oceans. To 
overcome this barrier, natural gas exporters (and importers) resort to LNG technology, 
which requires converting the natural gas into liquid using large compressors. The LNG 
is then stored in huge high-pressure storage tankers in special carrier ships and 
transported to destination. The LNG is than converted back into gas at destination ports 
and connected to the domestic natural gas network of pipelines. All three steps of the 
LNG exporting procedure require huge investments in the underlying infrastructure. For 
instance, American corporations have invested more than $200 billion only in Gulf of 
Mexico LNG importing facilities during past decade. The huge upfront investments 
required for import/export of natural gas -and its inherently costly procedure- creates 
relatively isolated markets in different regions of the world. This makes natural gas 
markets and its price dynamics completely different from crude oil. Different types of 
crude oil may have different prices in different regions of the world but crude oil prices 
are often highly correlated. In contrast, natural gas producers often face barriers to entry 
to other markets; hence price dispersions can be significant in different regions of the 
world. In North America, natural gas sells for around $4 per million British thermal units 
(mBTU) while in Europe it costs around $12 mBTU and it may reach up to $20 mBTU in 
Asia. This gap has specially widened recently because of increased shale gas production, 
which caused the prices of natural gas to decline significantly in U.S. 
The vast number of natural gas producers in U.S. allows for competition so the 
U.S. natural gas prices are determined competitively and may be highly volatile 
depending on new discoveries and demand prospects. 
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Figure 3.4: Significant price dispersions in different natural gas markets 
In contrast, the natural gas market is highly concentrated in Europe, with a large 
share of its natural gas being imported from Russia via pipelines. Building a pipeline 
between two countries is a customer-specific investment, which raises special contractual 
concerns. If any of the two parties decides not to engage in the envisioned trading 
scheme, the investments on the pipeline will be wasted. To avoid this hold-up problem, 
the parties involved in natural gas exports/imports usually sign long term contracts, in 
some cases lasting for decades. Because of the localized markets of natural gas, devising 
a reasonable pricing mechanism is crucial in designing these long-term contracts. A 
common approach in long term natural gas contracts is indexing the natural gas price to 
the price of an specified type of crude oil. For instance, Russia is a major supplier of 
Europe’s natural gas and the price of its natural gas is mostly indexed to crude oil prices. 
As a result, natural gas prices in Europe have remained high, in tandem with oil prices, 
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although they have experienced a downward swing in U.S. after increased production 
from shale resources.  
 
 
Figure 3.5. divergence between the price of crude oil natural gas after shale gas 
revolution in US.  
3.2.2. Natural Gas Futures Contracts 
Futures contracts are signed between two parties for delivery of a specified good 
at certain point of time in future at agreed upon price. The commodities futures contracts 
are widely traded and help the two parties hedge their investments. It also aggregates and 
reflects the available information in the market about suspected price shocks in the future. 
For instance, discovery of a new gas reserve that will come on line in two years will be 
comprehended by the industry experts, who have the knowledge and expertise about the 
industry. They can predict the effect of the new discovery on prices after the newly 
discovered reserves start production. As a result, they will have incentive to sell more 2-
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year futures contracts to lock in higher prices at the maturity date of their contracts. The 
increased supply of 2-year futures contracts will reduce the prices of these contracts. 
Hence, assuming that the markets are efficient, any newly available information will be 
reflected in futures contracts prices. Even non-experts can rely on futures contracts –and 
the evolution of their prices– as a gauge of what the informed market players believe 
about the innovation of prices.  Thus, futures contracts also play an important role as 
aggregators of available information in the market.  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Increasing trading volume for natural gas 12-month futures contracts, over 
time (for delivery at Henry Hub). The trading volume was less than 6000 in 
each month during early 1990’s but has increased to more than 10000 after 
2000’s and it is growing significantly. 
In contrast to crude oil futures contracts that are widely traded across the world, 
the trading volume in natural gas contracts is significantly lower because of the localized 
nature of its markets. The natural gas futures contracts in U.S. are mostly traded based on 
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delivery at the Henry Hub in Louisiana, which is the intersection of several interstate 
natural gas pipelines. Although these contracts have been traded since early 1990s, the 
trading volume has picked up from late 1990s. Hence, we will restrict our attention to the 
past 13 years in which trading volumes have been higher than 1000 contracts per month, 
which roughly corresponds to a daily average of 500 contracts.   
 
The buyer of a futures contract may gain or lose because of the arrival of new 
information. Consider a buyer who purchases a natural gas futures contract in July 2013 
who has agreed to pay $5/mBTU at the delivery date of July 1st 2014. If new natural gas 
resources are discovered and market players believe that the price of natural gas will 
decline to $4.8/mBTU in July 2014, the contract with the maturity date of July 2014 will 
now be worth only $4.8/mBTU but the buyer is committed to pay $5/mBTU hence she 
will lose $0.2/mBTU. Conversely, assume for instance that export restrictions are 
removed and prices are expected to rise to $6/mBTU in July 2014, the value of the 
contract at hand will increase and its owner will gain from expected upward movements 
in the market.40 
Both manufacturers and stock market participants who are interested in learning 
about expected future prices of natural gas but lack the knowledge and expertise to 
analyze the energy markets in detail, can take note from the evolution of these futures 
contracts prices. My hypothesis is that if natural gas prices are significant factors in the 
core competiveness of energy intensive industries, the stock prices of these companies 
should react negatively to positive price innovations of futures contracts as these positive 
shocks are indicative of an increase in expected price in future. The direction of the price 
                                                 
40
 The exact amount of return that one obtains from engaging in these contracts will depend on the margin 
limits for these contracts, which may be variable in different circumstances but are mostly in 5%-10% 
range. 
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innovations and their magnitude can be perceived by considering the unanticipated 
gains/losses in buying these contracts and holding them over time. 
To obtain a measure of these unanticipated gains/losses arising from buying 
natural gas futures contracts, I construct a time series of gains/losses from buying and 
holding these contracts. Consider an agent who buys a 13-month futures contract at time t 
and pays T%. If he holds his/her contract for one month, it will be worth TT%, 
because the contract is now equivalent to a 12-month futures contract sold at t+1 and 
maturing at t+13. The difference between T% and TT% will be the one-month gain 
from engaging in this trading activity. If this gain is positive, there has been an 
unanticipated news in the market regarding the future prices of the underlying 
commodity, namely natural gas. Hence, the stock market participants can benefit from 
the information aggregation role of futures markets to learn about the future profitability 
of energy intensive industries. If the price of natural gas is in fact a substantial element in 
profitability of these industries, it will in turn be reflected in the stock value of the 
corresponding companies.  
To test this hypothesis, I regress the monthly stock returns of energy intensive 
industries on the monthly return of described trading strategies for 13-month natural gas 
futures contracts. I control for Fama-French three factors to account for common risk 
factors that may affect the stock returns. 
 
3.2.3. Energy Intensive Industries 
According to EIA, energy intensive manufacturing accounts for more than half of 
total industrial energy use. Energy intensive industries' share of energy use is roughly 
twice their share of gross output. Recent cheap natural gas prices has spurred investments 
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in energy-intensive industries and increased the share of energy intensive industries.  
These industries may use different sources of energy such as electricity, coal, oil or 
natural gas. However, natural gas is one of the most important sources. According to the 
Department of Energy (2009), the source of 40% of total industrial energy consumption 
is natural gas. 
In addition to industries that use natural gas as their major source of energy, there 
are some industries that are positively affected by shale gas revolution because they rely 
on ethane, propane which are by products of natural gas and their abundant supply has 
caused their prices to decline in tandem with natural gas.  
There are different classifications of energy intensive industries by different 
sources. I use the classification by American Chemistry Council (2012) to obtain the list 
of these industries as presented in table 3.1. They include 7 major industry groups 
including Paper, Chemicals (excluding Pharmaceuticals), Plastic & Rubber Products, 
Glass, Iron and Steel, Aluminum and Fabricated Metal Products. After identifying these 
broad categories, I used the Fama French 49 industries classification to narrow down the 
list of SIC codes. I then manually went through the list of 4-digit Standardized Industry 
Classifications to identify corresponding SIC codes. I then used the list of these SIC 
codes to download relevant companies’ stock market data from Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS).  
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Industry Fama French portfolios 4-digit SIC 
code 
Paper Building paper and board mills 
Paper and allied products 
Paper and allied products 
Manifold business forms 
Paperboard containers, boxes, 
2600-2639 
2640-2659 
2670-2699 
2660-2661          
2760-2761 
Chemicals 
(excluding 
Pharmaceuticals) 
Chemicals and allied products 
Industrial inorganical chemistry 
Plastic material & synthetic resin 
Paints 
Industrial organic chemistry 
Agriculture chemicals 
2800-2809          
2810-2819 
2820-2829      
2850-2859  
2860-2869 
2870-2879  
Plastic & 
Rubber Products 
Reclaimed rubber 
Rubber & plastic hose and belting 
Gaskets, hoses, etc 
Fabricated rubber products 
3031-3031          
3041-3041          
3050-3053          
3060-3069          
3070-3079     
Glass Pressed and blown glass 
Glass products 
Flat glass 
Glass containers 
3229-3229           
3230-3231          
3210-3211          
3220-3221 
Iron and Steel Primary metal industries 
Blast furnaces & steel works 
Iron & steel foundries 
Prim smelt-refinery nonferrous metals 
Secondary smelt-refinery nonferrous 
metals 
Rolling & drawing nonferrous metals 
Non-ferrous foundries and casting 
Steel works etc 
Misc primary metal products 
3300-3300           
3310-3317          
3320-3325          
3330-3339          
 
3340-3341          
3350-3357          
3360-3369          
3370-3379          
3390-3399 
Aluminum Bauxite and other aluminum ores 1050-1059 
Fabricated Metal 
Products 
Fabricated metal, except  machinery  
Fabricated plate work 
Sheet metal work 
Metal forgings and stampings 
Coating and engraving 
Metal cans and shipping containers 
3400-3400 
3443-3443          
3444-3444          
3460-3469          
3470-3479 
3410-3412 
Table 3.1 list of energy intensive industries and corresponding 4 digit SIC codes 
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To better present the effect of natural gas on industries with different levels on energy 
intensity, I divide the energy intensive industries into highly energy intensive and 
moderately energy intensive industries using a measure constructed from estimates by 
Energy Information Administration and Census Bureau. These measure are presented in 
Table 3.2. and obtained as follows. The total natural gas consumption in each industry is 
obtained from EIA and is presented in second column. The total shipment value of the 
products in these industries which roughly corresponds to their sales is obtained from the 
Census Bureau. Finally, the ratio of natural gas costs to total sales of the industry is 
calculated assuming an average delivery price of $8/MCF to industrial consumers.  
 
Industry Natural gas 
consumption, 
based on EIA 
estimates, 
2012 (BCF) 
Total 
shipment 
based on 
Census 
Bureau, 
2012 
($billion)  
Natural 
gas  share 
(% of 
industry 
energy 
use) 
Additional 
output based 
on ACC 
estimates 
($billion) 
Natural Gas 
Intensity Index:  
ratio natural gas 
expenditure from 
total sales (2012)  
Paper 460 170.2 20 $3.70 2% 
Chemicals 
(excluding 
Pharmaceuticals) 
1700 483.6 33 70 2% 
Plastic & Rubber 
Products 
125 186 38 33 0.5% 
Glass 150 20 53 0.66 6% 
Iron and Steel 375 114 35 5 3% 
Aluminum 180 22 49 1.69 3% 
Foundries 120 26 44 0.62 4% 
Fabricated Metal 
Products 
235 327 61 5.81 0.6% 
Table 3.2. Energy Intensity Index. Source: EIA and Census Bureau  
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3.3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
I empirically evaluate the stock market reactions of publicly traded companies in 
energy intensive industries to arrival of new information about the evolution of the cost 
of an input factor in future. To test this hypothesis, I regress the monthly stock returns of 
companies in energy intensive industries41 on the gains/losses from buying 13-month 
natural gas futures contracts and holding them for one month. I control for Fama-French 
three factors to account for common risk factors that may affect the stock returns. 
 
 =  + z: − < + z	i + z	i +  + 												(3.1) 
 
where   is the monthly excess return (over risk free rate) of mth stock,  −  is the 
monthly excess return of market over risk free rate, SMB is the difference between the 
return of the small cap stocks and large cap stocks, HML is the difference between high 
book-to-market ratio stocks and low book-to-market ratio stocks and NGR measures the 
innovations in future natural gas prices. The first three variables are Fama-French 
proposed risk factors and NGR is the difference between the 13-month futures contracts 
at the beginning of previous month and the 12 month futures contracts at present 
normalized by the 12 month futures contracts at present. 
 
 = (T − T )/	T 																			(3.2) 
 
where   is the futures contract signed at time τ for delivery at time t and captures the 
gain from buying a 13 month natural gas futures contract during the last month and 
holding it for one period.  
                                                 
41
 I have discussed the selection process of these companies in more detail in previous section.  
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  To better present the effect of natural gas I divide the energy intensive industries 
into 2 distinct groups based on a measure I develop for the level of their dependence on 
natural gas. Define  
 
¡¢¡£ = ¡¤¥¦¤§	¨¤	©ª¡¥«ª¡	∗¡¤¥¦¤§	¨¤	«¦©¢­¤§¥¢	ª	®«¢¡           (3.3) 
l¡¡£ measures the ratio of total sales to total money spent on natural gas 
consumption. We can define an indicator based on this measure which takes the value of 
1 when an industry consumes high gas volumes compared to its total sales and takes o 
otherwise. 
t = ¯1					m	¡¢¡£ ≥ 4%0					sℎpk}mtp																			 														(3.4) 
We can run separate regressions for highly gas intensive industries and low gas 
intensive ones to be able to compare the sensitivities of these industries to changes in gas 
prices.  
 
3.4. DATA 
This section is dedicated to describing the data that I use in my statistical analysis.  
The time window of our analysis is restricted by the trading volume of natural gas futures 
contracts which have been very low in 1990s. Hence I pick the January 2000 to present as 
my time window of analysis.  
I obtained both the prices and trading volume of the futures contracts for natural 
gas from Bloomberg Terminal on a monthly basis from January 2000 to April 2013. The 
natural gas futures prices are quoted for delivery at Henry Hub in Louisiana.  
The stock market data is obtained from CRSP through Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS). The universe of companies is restricted to all those that had one of 
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their Standard International Classification Codes listed as energy intensive industries 
SIC4 ( Table 3.1).  
The monthly Fama-French three factors are available from Kenneth French’s 
website.42 The Fama French 49 industries classification is also obtained from the same 
website as a guideline for finding energy intensive industries, although not explicitly used 
in empirical analysis.  
Natural gas prices are obtained from the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA)43 portal for natural gas data. The industry sector revenue used for calculations of 
energy intensity index is also obtained from ACC (2012) which has in turn been gathered 
from the Census Bureau.  
 
3.5. ESTIMATION RESULTS  
The regression results are presented in this section. The model specification 
described in equation (3.1) is estimated. After observations with missing variables and 
implausible figures are dropped, there are in total 75571 month-firm observations in our 
sample.  
There are multiple observations at any time period, corresponding to different 
companies. The stock market valuation of these stocks may be correlated across firms. 
Hence, the estimated standard errors may become higher than their true values if we do 
not address the correlation within each time period. To deal with this problem with 
cluster our observations at each point of time, allowing for correlation of error terms 
within each time period.  
                                                 
42
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/ 
43
 http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/data.cfm 
 81 
The estimation results are presented in Table 3.3.  We expect that positive shocks 
to futures prices of natural gas should have a negative effect on the stock returns of the 
energy intensive industries. Column 1 demonstrates the regression results for all energy 
intensive industries in our sample. In contrast to our expectation, the estimated coefficient 
for natural gas positive price shocks is positive though insignificant. We can conclude 
that price innovations in natural gas prices do not have a significant effect on profitability 
of energy intensive companies. This result has important implications as it shows that 
contrary to claims of natural gas exports critics, the competitiveness of the companies in 
these industries is not highly dependent on future gas prices.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Excess Return 
All Energy  
Intensive Industries 
High Gas Intensity 
industries 
Low Gas Intensity 
industries 
    
Market-RF 0.965*** 0.917*** 0.975*** 
 (3.618) (3.540) (3.628) 
HML 0.576 0.625* 0.571 
 (1.494) (1.672) (1.472) 
SMB 1.213*** 1.324*** 1.196*** 
 (3.434) (3.942) (3.351) 
NGR 0.184 -0.282* 0.255* 
 (1.194) (-1.800) (1.652) 
    
Observations 75,429 10,145 65,284 
R-squared 0.060 0.073 0.062 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.3. Estimation Results: Effect of Natural Gas Futures on Market Return for 
different energy intensity case. Model (1) includes all energy intensive 
industries in U.S. Model (2) includes only industries with high natural gas 
intensity. The third column includes only firms with low natural gas 
intensity.  
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I split the sample into two groups, as described in the previous section, based on 
the ratio of their natural gas expenditure to their total sales. I call the industries with high 
spending levels on natural gas “high gas intensity industries” and the rest of the sample as 
“low gas intensity industries”. The estimation results for these two groups is presented in 
columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.3. The sample size for highly energy intensive industries 
is reduced to 9020 observations. Although the coefficients on other control variables are 
not affected substantially, the coefficient on NGR becomes significant and negative. It is 
important to notice that NGR is the rate of change between two futures contracts initiated 
in different dates but with the same maturity dates. This implies that a one percent change 
in natural gas futures contracts will cause the return on the stocks of gas intensive 
companies to decline by 0.28% after controlling for other risk factors that may affect the 
stock returns. 
 
3.6. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
New extraction technologies have made U.S. natural gas production from vast 
shale gas resources possible. The increased natural gas production reduced prices and 
kept them at a low level, which benefited energy intensive manufacturing industries. 
Debates about whether the government should allow natural gas exports or restrict it to 
keep prices low, have been pursued fiercely by both energy intensive industries and 
natural gas producers.  
Shale gas has undoubtedly changed the global scene for the future of natural gas 
production in both in U.S. and the world. It will definitely affect overall U.S. 
competitiveness positively. However, this research empirically tests and documents that 
its role and importance is often exaggerated. In this research, I focused on the stock 
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market reactions of companies in energy intensive industries to the unexpected price 
shocks in natural gas futures markets. My results show that stock markets do not react 
significantly to innovations in the expected price of natural gas, proxied for by natural 
gas futures contracts. This implies that either the effect is weak or that the market 
participants fail to incorporate the arriving information into their valuation of 
corresponding companies.  
To better differentiate these effects for those industries that are highly dependent 
on natural gas from those that may be less energy intensive or more dependent on other 
forms of energy, I used a measure for natural gas intensity based on the ratio of natural 
gas expenditure to the size of the industry. The results show that the stock market value 
of more gas intensive industries are indeed negatively affected by upward innovations in 
natural gas prices and the rest of the industries do not show a significant reaction. This 
observation shows that although the cheaper natural gas prices may give substantial 
competitive advantage to a small group of U.S. manufacturing sector, the effect is not 
widespread enough to justify restricting natural gas exports especially since the price gap 
between U.S. and other parts of the world has been widening in recent years.  
This research can be extended in several directions. One possible extension is to 
incorporate the past investment activity of energy intensive industries in our empirical 
analysis. Firms that have invested heavily in gas intensive industries should be more 
inclined to respond more severely to natural gas price shocks, which will be reflected in 
the monthly return of corresponding stocks.  
A further step into evaluating the effect of long term cheap natural gas on energy 
intensive manufacturing will be to analyze the reverse channel, investigating how cheap 
natural gas has fostered investment. The main obstacle in implementing this approach is 
to pick the right control group for comparison. The best candidate is to select a group of 
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similar companies outside U.S. that face higher natural gas prices but compete with U.S. 
companies in the same markets globally. The main constraint is to find the comparable 
and consistent measures on investment activity between companies inside and outside 
U.S. because datasets such as COMPUSTAT report different items for U.S. companies 
and global companies and the researchers should explore other alternatives to find 
suitable measures for investment activity.  
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